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ABSTRACT

Hettich, Rachel C. M.S., Purdue University, May 2015. Subsidizing Carbon
Sequestration via Forestry in Maryland: A Cost-Benefit Assessment. Major Professor:
Philip Abbott.
Carbon sequestration by forestry is one way to mitigate climate change, and policy
incentives are in place to encourage private investment in forestry. State and federal
forestry cost-share programs subsidize the establishment of trees and the improvement of
existing forested land. The objective of this research was to determine the effectiveness
of such programs in Maryland and to compare the monetized benefits from permanently
sequestered carbon with the current subsidies. To meet this objective, private and social
cost-benefit analyses were conducted for three forestry investment scenarios in Maryland
that coincide with the main cost-share programs available there. Sensitivity analysis
considered a range of values for the social cost of carbon, the discount rate, and program
implementation costs.
The first program considered was the state funded Woodland Incentive Program
(WIP), which provides cost-share assistance for improving timber management.
According to the cost-benefit analysis results, the program provides sufficient incentives
to induce participation. For a discount rate of 5%, the investment in pre-commercial
thinning with participation in WIP increases discounted returns by $60.62 per acre.
However, the total program enrollment over the past eight years was only 24,443 acres,
compared to GIS analysis results that show approximately 737,000 acres across Maryland
are eligible for the program. The total cost share assistance provided by WIP for a timber
management improvement practice of pre-commercial thinning was $81.34 per acre,
while from society’s view, the discounted carbon sequestration benefits provided by the
improved timber stand were $146.82 per acre. By basing the cost-share assistance on the

xi
carbon benefits, and so increasing the subsidies, potential and actual program
participation may converge.
Two land conversion programs were considered: the federally funded Environmental
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the state funded Lawn to Woodland (L2W)
Initiative. The cost-benefit analysis results show that the conversion from cropland to
forest through EQIP does not provide enough incentive to induce program participation.
Cropland rents generate income far greater than the benefits from forestry conversion,
even when carbon benefits are included. In this case, the program is already providing
subsidies larger than the carbon sequestration benefits, and the actual participation of
only 344 acres between 2009 and 2013 is still very low. However, when using the
pastureland rent, which is about half of the cropland rent, the conversion to forest is much
more likely. There are around 750,000 acres of pastureland in Maryland that could be
converted to forest to increase carbon sequestration across the state.
The conversion from lawn to forest through L2W provided contrasting results. Since
timber harvest is unlikely following the conversion from lawn to forest, the carbon
benefits are much higher. The cost-share assistance was $335.91 per acre, and the
discounted carbon benefits from the conversion were $1,245.87 per acre. Cost-share
assistance based on the benefits from permanently sequestered carbon could justify
increasing the incentive to participate by almost four times. Since neither land use in this
scenario provides financial returns to the owner, the investment decision depends largely
on the aesthetic values of lawn versus forest that the landowner possesses, which are
difficult to estimate. GIS analysis estimated that approximately 230,000 acres are eligible
for this new program across Maryland.
Maryland is at the forefront when compared to other states, supplementing federal
cost-share programs with its own resources to combat climate change. This analysis
suggests the state financed initiatives may exhibit the potential to enhance carbon
sequestration more than the federal programs, and for each state program there was scope
to increase subsidies given the value of carbon benefits realized.
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CHAPTER 1.

1.1

INTRODUCTION

Motivation

Increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and their impact on climate change
have emerged as key political and economic topics in the United States and around the
world. The impact of GHG emissions on climate change depends on several factors,
including land use allocation and natural resource management (National Research
Council, 2010). For example, maintaining existing forests and establishing new forests
are two ways to mitigate the negative effects of GHG emissions because forests can
sequester and store carbon.
Forests provide many co-benefits in addition to carbon sequestration, such as
improved water quality, improved air quality, wildlife habitat, recreational opportunities,
and aesthetics. The value of these non-market benefits can be estimated, but private forest
owners do not receive full financial compensation equal to the benefits they provide to
society. In other words, the positive externalities that the forest owner provides to society
are not fully internalized. Subsidies offered by government sponsored forestry cost-share
programs help make it less costly for landowners to plant and maintain trees. However, it
is not evident whether the subsidies are adequate to overcome the opportunity costs from
investing in forestry. Moreover, social benefits from the positive externalities provided
by forestry may justify larger subsidies that would elicit greater program participation.
Through cost-benefit analysis (CBA), this research compares the profitability of
owning forestland, including the possibility of participating in a government cost-share
program, with other land use alternatives such as agriculture or lawn space. Further, a
CBA from society’s perspective1, including the internalization of carbon sequestration
1.

I did not attempt to fully internalize the social value of all co-benefits from forestry

investments. Prior literature does not provide good estimates of the value of these benefits in
mostly rural areas
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benefits, was conducted to compare current cost-share assistance with the societal carbon
benefits. The focus is on forestry cost-share programs implemented in the state of
Maryland.
Maryland is at the forefront in addressing climate change on a broad scale, and
especially when it comes to dedicating time and money to conserving its forests and
providing incentives for landowners to do the same. 40% of Maryland’s land is currently
forested, and the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) has implemented many
measures to maintain or expand this forest cover. For example, the Woodland Incentive
Program (WIP) provides cost sharing to private woodland owners for planting new trees
and implementing practices that improve existing timber stands (Maryland Forest
Service, 2008). Another new program in Maryland is the Lawn to Woodland Initiative
(L2W), which offers private landowners the opportunity to convert their existing lawn to
trees at no cost to them (Maryland Forest Service, 2014).
These state forestry cost-share programs, along with federal programs administered
by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), serve as part of a larger GHG
Emissions Reduction Act Plan (GHGRP), passed in 2012, which established an overall
goal to reduce GHG emissions by 25% (using 2006 as the base year) in Maryland by
2020 (Department of the Environment, 2013). The forestry and sequestration efforts are
projected to result in a reduction of 4.56 million metric tons of carbon, which is 8.2% of
the total reduction goal.

1.2

Research Objectives

The aim of this study is first to evaluate whether landowners will invest in forestry
with and without participation in a cost-share program. In other words, the analysis
attempts to answer the question of whether the current subsidies are large enough to elicit
program participation from private landowners. Next, this research evaluates whether
larger subsidies would be justified by internalizing the carbon sequestration benefits the
public receives from the forestry investments. Larger subsidies may be required to
achieve greater program participation and carbon sequestration. Third, this research will

3
assess the potential for these forestry efforts to make a difference in the fight against
climate change in Maryland.
The analysis conducted consists of three forestry investment scenarios that align
with the three main forestry cost-share programs available to private landowners in
Maryland. The first investment scenario is a landowner that owns a loblolly pine stand
that is at the appropriate age to be pre-commercially thinned. Pre-commercial thinning is
a timber management improvement practice that is eligible for WIP, which is the forestry
cost-share program for this scenario. The next two scenarios are similar in that they both
consider converting land to forest. One investigates the conversion of agricultural land to
an oak/hickory forest, and the other looks at the conversion of lawn to a red oak forest.
Tree establishment on cropland is a conservation practice that is eligible for the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), which is administered by the USDA
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and tree establishment on lawns is the
purpose of the new L2W program in Maryland.
The net present value (NPV), which is the discounted value of a stream of annual
net revenues, is calculated for a base case in each scenario, which is the case without the
forestry investment in question. Next, the NPV is calculated assuming the landowner
makes the forestry investment under two cases: with participation in a forestry cost-share
program and without participation. Each of the NPVs are then calculated including
potential financial compensation for the value of permanently sequestered carbon that
results from the forestry investment. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to address
uncertainty in the appropriate discount rate, carbon prices, social cost of carbon
estimates, and scenario-specific elements.
To provide an idea of the scope of forestry cost-share programs in Maryland,
geographic information systems (GIS) analysis was also conducted, which ties in with
another motivation for this research. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) provided funding for this research as part of its Carbon Monitoring Systems
(CMS) program. Dubayah, Hurtt, Huang, and Swatantran (2013) participated in the CMS
program and developed several GIS data layers for the state of Maryland that report the
tree cover, tree height, and aboveground biomass present. From these data layers and a
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combination of other analyses, carbon sequestration potential of the land in Maryland
was also calculated. There are various uses of the data produced by Dubayah et al.
(2013), including using the data to monitor the success of forestry cost-share programs or
to target eligible landowners. For this research, the data were used in the GIS analysis to
estimate the total land in Maryland that is eligible for the forestry cost-share programs
included in this research and the carbon sequestration potential should full program
participation be achieved. The results of the GIS analysis provide another element to
compare the actual and predicted program participation with the overall program
potential.

1.3

Highlights of Main Conclusions

For the improving timber management scenario, pre-commercial thinning
accelerates stand growth, which also accelerates carbon sequestration. For these reasons,
the investment is definitely positive from a societal view, and it is positive from a private
view if the additional timber benefits outweigh the pre-commercial thinning costs. At a
discount rate of 5% (a typical private discount rate) and no participation in WIP, the
benefits from pre-commercial thinning do not outweigh the costs. However, with costshare assistance from WIP, the investment in pre-commercial thinning is worth it, even at
a discount rate of 5%. WIP seems to be providing enough incentive for landowners to
choose to improve timber management, and investing more in this program could
increase carbon sequestration. The results of the GIS analysis estimate that around
737,000 acres of land in Maryland are eligible for WIP. However, from 2007 to 2014,
only 814 landowners have participated in the program for improved management
practices on 24,443 acres. Using the constant social cost of carbon estimate at a discount
rate of 2.5% (a typical social discount rate), the carbon benefits provided by the improved
timber management over the investment horizon are worth $146.82 per acre, while the
current cost-share assistance is only $81.34 per acre. While the program already appears
to provide the correct incentives to induce landowner participation, the actual
participation may be increased by basing the cost-share assistance on benefits from
permanently sequestered carbon.
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For the conversion from cropland to forest scenario, the NPVs with annual
collection of cropland cash rent are significantly higher than those of converting to forest,
even with the cost-share assistance from EQIP. The NPVs are positive in all cases when
the land is converted to forest, but they are not large enough to cover the opportunity cost
of converting from agriculture. Even with the inclusion of carbon benefits, the landowner
would likely not choose to convert their land to forestry. When the pastureland rent is
used instead of the cropland rent, the NPVs from converting and participating in EQIP
are higher than those without conversion for discount rates of both 2.5% and 3%. From
2009 to 2013, tree stand establishments have been conducted on 344 acres in Maryland,
which is a small number as predicted by the analysis results. Perhaps by targeting
marginal cropland or pastureland, the program would have greater participation for tree
establishment practices.
For the conversion from lawn to forest scenario, the NPVs from converting to
forest are substantially higher than those of maintaining lawn, even without harvesting
any timber. The costs of managing a forest are much lower than those of managing a
lawn. The decision of the landowner to participate in L2W and establish trees on their
lawn space is largely determined by the aesthetic values of the landowner. Since it seems
unlikely that the landowner would choose to harvest timber from one acre of trees,
neither land use provides market benefits to the landowner, making the aesthetic benefits
very important. The internalization of public benefits from carbon sequestration would
make the investment in converting to forest even more attractive to the landowner. Using
the constant social cost of carbon estimate discounted at 2.5%, the discounted carbon
benefits provided by the conversion are worth $1,245.87 per acre when no timber is
harvested, which is substantially higher than the current cost-share assistance of $335.91
per acre. The GIS analysis results estimate that around 230,000 acres of land in Maryland
are eligible for L2W, which is much lower than the one million acre estimate set forth
when the program was first launched. Since the program is new, no conclusions can be
made regarding actual versus potential program participation, but the initial enrollment
appears to be slow. Because the carbon sequestration potential is high for land that has
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not already been forested, investing more in L2W could accelerate Maryland’s progress
towards its GHG reduction goals.
Overall, several cases resulted where the NPV from the forestry investment did not
exceed the opportunity costs using only private benefits and a typical private discount
rate of 5%, but with a discount rate of 2.5% and carbon benefits included, the opportunity
costs were exceeded. This represents a situation where the forestry investment is valuable
to society, but from a private perspective, the landowner would likely not make the
investment. The question of whether the government should make up the difference in
order to induce the private landowner to invest and ultimately better society is raised
from these results. Further, this question arises only with the internalization of one of the
co-benefits (carbon sequestration), and in reality, the social benefits from forestry would
be much more extensive.

1.4

Organization

The next chapter provides a review of climate change and forestry economics. The
chapter includes topics such as the state of carbon prices around the globe, forestry’s role
in the carbon cycle, and land use alternatives. Chapter Three presents an in-depth
explanation of Maryland’s climate change initiatives and the role that forestry plays.
Further, a detailed description of the forestry cost-share programs used for this analysis is
laid out, including the results of the GIS analysis conducted to determine program
eligibility across Maryland. Chapter Four discusses elements of CBA that are particularly
important to analyzing forestry investments such as discounting and optimal timber
rotations. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven explain the implementation of the three forestry
investment scenarios and the results from each. Specifically, Chapter Five presents the
improving timber management scenario and evaluates WIP, Chapter Six presents the
conversion from agricultural land to forest scenario and evaluates EQIP, and Chapter
Seven presents the conversion from lawn to forest scenario and evaluates L2W. Lastly,
Chapter Eight provides a synthesized set of conclusions that use the CBA results,
observed program participation, and the GIS analysis results. It also includes a discussion
of the analysis limitations, future research, and policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTRY ECONOMICS REVIEW

2.1

Summary of Topics

According to the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) most recent
assessment report, concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere have increased by
40% compared to pre-industrial levels, which is just one of many statistics that brings to
light the global carbon problem our world is currently facing (IPCC, 2013). Preventing
the problem from escalating and searching for a global solution have been important
topics in the political arena for over 20 years. A working group consisting of several
agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has been conducting
ongoing research since 2010 to estimate the social cost of carbon, which is used to
measure the benefits of carbon reductions in regulatory impact analyses (Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). Further, economies around the world
have implemented carbon pricing approaches to internalize the external costs of carbon
emissions, which is an important step towards mitigating climate change (World Bank &
ECOFYS, 2014).
One way that carbon in the atmosphere can be decreased is by sequestration, which
is the process of capturing and storing carbon.. Sequestration by forests plays an
important role in the carbon cycle, and increasing forested land is another component of
the fight against climate change (Richardson & Macauley, 2012). However, since several
alternative land uses to forestry exist, the costs and benefits that play a part in private
land use decisions must be considered (Liu, Merrill, Gold, Kellogg, & Uchida, 2013).
These topics will be covered in the following literature review to provide context for the
analysis that follows.
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2.2

Social Cost of Carbon

Estimates of the social cost of carbon vary immensely in the literature, depending
on what model is used and what assumptions are made. According to the interagency
working group discussed previously that includes the EPA, the definition of the social
cost of carbon is the “estimate of the economic damages associated with a small increase
in carbon emissions, conventionally one metric ton, in a given year.” Some of the
damages it includes are “changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property
damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate
change” (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). The interagency
group establishes four values for the social cost of carbon, which are based on the
average results of three well-known integrated assessment models (IAMs). The three
models are the Dynamic Integrated Climate and Economy (DICE) model, first presented
by Nordhaus (1994), the Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) model, first
presented by Hope, Anderson, and Wenman (1993), and the Climate Framework for
Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution (FUND) model, first presented by Tol (1997).
Pindyck (2013) defined IAMs as models that combine a climate science model with
an economic model. There are six main elements to the common IAMs (DICE, PAGE,
and FUND): future carbon emissions projections, future atmospheric carbon projections,
projections of climate changes as a result of higher carbon concentrations, economic
impacts from higher temperature projections, abatement cost estimates, and utility and
time preferences. The modeler has freedom to specify key components of the model,
generally requiring strong assumptions regarding the functional forms and parameter
values, which is why the models produce differing results.
The models vary in how temperature changes are translated into economic damages
(Greenstone, Kopits, & Wolverton, 2013). PAGE includes damages in three broad
categories, while FUND and DICE include damages in several narrower categories.
PAGE and DICE both include the possibility of catastrophic higher temperatures, while
FUND does not. Another variation between the three models is in how they account for
adaptation as a response to climate change. FUND induces adaptation practices in certain
sectors, PAGE imposes adaptation exogenously, and DICE does not explicitly account
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for adaptation. Overall, PAGE and DICE produce similar estimates of the social cost of
carbon, while FUND estimates are generally much lower.
Table 2.1 below shows the most recent estimates of the social cost of carbon from
2010 to 2050 using three different discount rates (2.5%, 3%, and 5%). These estimates
are used by the United States government in project and policy assessments. As Table 2.1
shows, the social cost of carbon estimates increase over time. This is the case because
“future emissions are expected to produce larger incremental damages as physical and
economic systems become more stressed in response to greater climate change”
(Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013, p. 14).
Table 2.1 Annual Social Cost of Carbon Estimates, 2010-2050
(2007 $/ton)
Discount Rate

5.0%

3.0%

2.5%

2010

11

32

51

2015

11

37

57

2020

12

43

64

2025

14

47

69

2030

16

52

75

2035

19

56

80

2040

21

61

86

2045

24

66

92

2050

26

71

97

Year

(Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013)
As one can see in Table 2.1, the discount rate chosen has quite an impact on the
social cost of carbon. The discount rate reflects the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption now and consumption in the future, and it used to calculate the net present
value of a stream of future damages (Greenstone et al., 2013). The common discount
rates used by government agencies are 2.5%, 3%, and 5%. The two higher discount rates
are determined by historical interest rates. Since there is a popular concern that interest
rates are uncertain in the future, the low discount rate is included as well. As the discount
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rate increases, the future becomes less important in the calculation. For example, the
social cost of carbon in 2010 is $11 per ton using 5% as the discount rate and $51 per ton
using 2.5%, which is a difference of $40. The power of discounting can make a drastic
difference in calculating the damage caused by carbon emissions.
Which discount rate to use causes a lot of disagreement about which social cost of
carbon is accurate. Further, the limitations of IAMs are believed to underestimate the true
damage caused by increased carbon emissions (Stern, 2013). Overall, the models have
remained mostly the same since their development. For example, weak damage functions
have continued to prevail as the models have evolved despite advancements in research
about the impacts of climate change. Greenstone et al. (2013) pointed out that the IAMs
do not include inter-sectoral or inter-regional relationships. For example, the damages in
one region on a neighboring region are not captured. Further, the IAMs do not account
for changes in technology that will decrease the costs of adaptation practices over time.
Moore and Diaz (2015) recently published the results of their modified DICE model,
which was altered to include the impact of increasing temperature on long-run GDP
growth. They concluded that the social cost of carbon is actually as high as $220 per ton.
Several limitations to IAMs can be discussed, but the important takeaway is that
researchers are continually working to increase the accuracy of the social cost of carbon
estimates and lower the discrepancy between estimates.

2.3

Carbon Markets

Carbon markets exist to internalize the externality of carbon emissions
(MacKenzie, 2009). Without them, emitters do not have to bear the full cost of the
external damage they cause to society. Carbon pricing instruments include carbon taxes
and cap-and-trade schemes, and carbon markets use one of these approaches or a
combination of both. The majority of carbon prices that have recently emerged from
carbon markets are much lower than the social cost of carbon estimates discussed in the
previous section. The social cost of carbon estimates the damage from future carbon
emissions. In contrast to the social cost of carbon, carbon prices that have emerged from
carbon markets are signals of the costs of mitigation now. In other words, the social cost
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of carbon is the damage if we do nothing, and the carbon price is the cost to do something
now. The relatively low carbon prices are an indication of the value of mitigating now to
avoid the higher cost of damages in the future.
Cap-and-trade starts with the government setting a ‘cap,’ which is a maximum
amount of aggregate total emissions (MacKenzie, 2009). A corresponding number of
permits is distributed, either by giving them away or selling them at an auction. The
‘trade’ part comes in when firms buy and sell permits with each other depending on how
much it costs them to reduce emissions compared to other firms. The price of carbon
depends on how severe the cap is and it reflects to some extent the cost of reducing
carbon. As the cap increases, allowing more emissions, the price of carbon decreases.
Similarly, as the cap tightens, the price of carbon increases. Another important part of
emissions trading schemes is the inclusion of offset credits. Offset credits are given for
projects that reduce carbon emissions in one area in order to allow emissions in another
area. Examples are the development of renewable energy, increased energy efficiency,
and land-use change. An offset project of specific importance to this research is that of
forestry offsets.
Using a carbon tax allows the carbon price to be set by the government through
policy at a certain amount (World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). Using the well-known
Pigouvian approach, the optimal carbon tax should be set equal to its marginal social
damage (Cremer, Gahvari, & Ladoux, 1998). This would mean that the carbon tax should
be set to equal the governmental social cost of carbon estimate, but this has not happened
because of uncertainty in markets and the social cost of carbon estimates themselves.
Carbon taxes are often used in areas where there are not a large enough number of
emitters to have a successful trading scheme. They are also used in conjunction with
emissions trading approaches. For example, carbon taxes are combined with offset credits
in South Africa and Mexico. Unique carbon market designs that blend different pricing
approaches are essential for finding the most effective and efficient way to run a carbon
market.
Different approaches produce vastly different carbon prices internationally. For
example, the Tokyo cap-and-trade price is $95 per ton, while the Regional GHG
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Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeastern United States sells carbon credits for around $3 per
ton (World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). The carbon prices from the 2014 World Bank
Group Report for different economies around the world are included in the Table 2.2 and
Table 2.3 below. Table 2.2 shows the carbon taxes set by governments, some of which
have lower and upper limits as shown. Table 2.3 shows the carbon prices that have
emerged from cap-and-trade schemes. The carbon price in Japan of $95 per ton is an
outlier, which is attributed to the fact that no excess credits were sold when the market
was implemented, so no trading was possible.
Table 2.2 Carbon Taxes around the World
($ per ton of carbon)
Region

Carbon Tax

Sweden

168

Norway

4-69

Switzerland

68

Finland

48

Denmark

31

British Columbia, Canada

28

Ireland

28

Australia

22

United Kingdom

16

France

10

Iceland

10

South Africa

5

Mexico
Japan

1-4
2

(World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014)
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Table 2.3 Carbon Prices from Cap-and-Trade Programs around the World
($ per ton of carbon)
Region

Carbon Price

Tokyo

95

California, United States

11

Shenzhen, China

11

Guangdong, China

10

Quebec, Canada

10

Beijing, China

9

European Union

9

Shanghai, China

5

Tianjin, China

4

RGGI, United States

3

New Zealand

1

(World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014)

The two emissions trading schemes within the United States are in California and
in the Northeastern region (RGGI). The California Cap-and-Trade Program was
established in 2012, and the first compliance period began on January 1, 2013 (World
Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). Carbon offsets are sold within the continental United States
and Quebec. Carbon permits were initially allocated by the government to large entities
based on production and efficiency, and the rest are auctioned off periodically. The
original emissions cap was set 2% below the 2012 forecast of emissions, and it was set to
decline 2% in 2014 and 3% in 2015 (Kossoy & Guigon, 2012). The carbon price at the
beginning of 2012 was $15.40, which spiked at the end of July and then steadily
decreased to around $11 by the end of 2012 (Climate Policy Iniative, 2015). In 2013, the
price increased to $16.40 at the beginning of January but decreased back to around $11
by the end of the year. At the beginning of 2015, the carbon price was $13.02, and has
remained steady since then. The GHG Reduction Fund in California receives the auction
proceeds, which are used to reach three main goals: sustainability in communities, clean
and efficient energy, and improved waste diversion.
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RGGI, launched in 2009, is a market-based program designed to reduce carbon
emissions from power plants in the following nine states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont
(World Bank & ECOFYS, 2014). In 2014, a new emissions cap of 91 million tons of
carbon was implemented, which is 45% less than the previous cap set in 2012. The cap
was lowered so substantially because the actual emissions had consistently been about
35% lower than the earlier cap. The cap will decline by 2.5% annually from 2015 to
2020. Most emission allowances are sold through auctions, and the proceeds are invested
to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy. The clearing price for the first
auction in September of 2008 was $3.07, which steadily decreased to around $1.90 by the
end of 2009 and stayed about the same until the end of 2012 (RGGI Inc., 2015). At the
beginning of 2013, the price started to increase, and the most recent auction in March of
2015 cleared at $5.41.
Both the RGGI and the California Cap-and-Trade Program incorporate forestry
offsets into their initiatives, which the next section discusses.

2.4

Forestry in the Carbon Process

While the main focus of climate change legislation tends to be the reduction of new
emissions, forestry plays a unique role in that it reduces carbon that is already in the
atmosphere. Forested lands possess the ability to sequester carbon from the atmosphere,
making them a valuable resource in the climate change arena. “Carbon sequestration is
the process of capture (through photosynthesis) and long-term storage of atmospheric
carbon dioxide” (Sedjo & Sohngen, 2012, p. 128).
The carbon sequestration process in forests takes place within tree biomass, which
is defined as “any part of living or nonliving tree tissue, for example, the trunk, branches,
leaves, or roots” (Sedjo & Sohngen, 2012, p. 128). The walls of plant cells are comprised
of cellulose or lignin, and carbon is needed to build these fibers. Plants sequester carbon
for this purpose through photosynthesis, which is critical for plant growth. Carbon is also
sequestered by the soils of forestland through two processes: humification and
microphotosynthesis. Humification occurs when plants die and their biomass decomposes
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into the soil, and microphotosynthesis occurs when photosynthetic bacteria in the soil
itself sequesters carbon from the atmosphere. Existing forests can be managed to increase
carbon sequestration in several ways such as extending harvest rotations or ensuring that
carbon storage is maintained in wood products after harvest (Cunha-e-Sa, Rosa, & CostaDuarte, 2013).
It is important to note that some of the sequestered carbon is released back into the
atmosphere during harvest or when the tree dies and starts to decompose. Exactly how
the forestry carbon cycle works depends on the tree species, the management practices
used, the rotation length, and the use for harvested wood. If the timber is burned for fuel,
the carbon will be released back into the atmosphere, but if it is used for building
furniture or houses, the carbon remains sequestered. Figure 2.1 shows a simplified
version of how vegetation sequesters and releases carbon through different facets.

Figure 2.1 Simplified Carbon Process (Wieland & Strebel, 2008)
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Since forestry is an important carbon sink, it makes sense that it would be included
in carbon markets as an offset option. RGGI allows forest offset projects in the form of
reforestation, improved forest management, avoided conversion, and afforestation (RGGI
Inc., 2013). Reforestation is when trees are established on land that had recently been
forested, and afforestation is when trees are established on land that was not previously
forested. All offset projects must be in one of the nine RGGI states, but afforestation is
only eligible in Connecticut and New York. Offset credits are awarded based on the net
additional tons of carbon sequestered within the project boundary for each period. The
California Cap-and-Trade Program allows the following forest offset projects:
reforestation, improved forest management, and avoided conversion (Air Resources
Board, 2011). The forestry projects can be located anywhere within the United States.
Like RGGI, the offset credits are awarded based on any carbon sequestered in addition to
a “business-as-usual” scenario. Protocols exist to establish the amount of carbon
sequestered as a result of the various forestry offsets.
Even though forestry offsets are included in many carbon markets, many
challenges have arisen in their implementation. The first is additionality, which is the
requirement that the emissions reductions (sequestration) would not have taken place if it
were not for the offset project (Chomitz, 2000). A common example of a project where
additionality is questionable is one where the project makes money and would be
implemented with or without the offset program. The second challenge is determining the
baseline “business as usual” scenario because so many different scenarios could take
place in absence of the project. Similarly, the third challenge is the measurement of
carbon sequestered with the project. Monitoring the progress of the offset project can
become very costly. Finally, permanence is of concern because of the possibility of
carbon sequestration being reversed, whether it is accidental or deliberate. Even though
the challenges seem great, forestry cannot be ignored as valuable offset option and an
integral piece in combating climate change.
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2.5

Forestry and Alternative Land Uses

As discussed above, forestland is valuable in the fight against climate change, but
that does not guarantee that it is a profitable land use choice for a private landowner. One
must consider alternative land uses such as agriculture and urban development.
Urbanization in the eastern United States is causing a decline in agricultural and forest
lands (Liu et al., 2013). With the loss of agricultural and forest lands also comes losses in
ecosystem services like water filtration, wildlife habitat, and carbon storage. Private
landowners have an incentive to provide private goods such as crops and timber, but they
do not necessarily have incentives to preserve ecosystem services that benefit society
since the positive social externalities are not internalized by the landowner.
One way to incentivize private landowners to provide ecosystem services is by
public policy. In the design of public policy, it is important to consider tradeoffs between
alternative land uses when thinking of ways to preserve ecosystem services (Liu et al.,
2013). For example, conversion to forestland improves water quality and sequesters
carbon, but it also takes land away from development and other agricultural uses.
Urbanization and crop production play an important role in regional economic growth,
which cannot be ignored. Decision-makers need to have an assessment of the tradeoffs
between multiple land uses and land management scenarios.
Private landowners make land use decisions based on the net present value (NPV)
of the future revenue streams from all land use options (Nelson & Hellerstein, 1997).
Output quantities, input and output prices, and the discount rate are all part of
determining the NPV for each land use. Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller (1999) estimated
land use shares by solving an individual landowner’s profit maximization problem in
three states: Maine, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. They then used an econometric
model to predict the estimated land use shares using rents from agriculture and forestry,
land quality measures, and transportation costs as explanatory variables. Rents from
forestry were measured as the NPV of future timber revenues per acre, and rents from
agriculture were measured as the NPV of future crop or pasture revenues per acre. They
used population density measures to explain the share of land that was developed. As
expected, their results showed that when forest rent increases, the share of agricultural
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land relative to forestland decreases, all else equal. The opposite is also true.
Interestingly, changes in forest and agricultural rents did not appear to have a significant
effect on the allocation of land to urban development.
Since this research has a focus on forestry, the rest of this section further explains
the costs and benefits associated with forestry ownership.
2.5.1

Private Costs of Forestry

There are two types of forest owners: industrial and nonindustrial. Industrial forest
lands are managed for timber production, and they are typically owned by wood
processing facilities (Newman & Wear, 1993). Owners of nonindustrial private forest
(NIPF) land are likely to value non-timber benefits, such as hunting, aesthetics, and wind
breaks, as highly as the timber production benefits. Newman and Wear (1993) compared
the behavior of industrial and nonindustrial forest owners, and they find that
nonindustrial owners still practice profit maximizing behavior. Both types of forest
owners will be treated equally in this research, and the NPV that maximizes profit will be
used to predict landowner decisions.
Most of the private costs of forest ownership are incurred at the time of forest
establishment. Site preparation includes clearing past logging residue, preparing
seedbeds, and controlling for weeds (Bair & Alig, 2006). Planting costs include
seedlings, shelters, stakes and other equipment. Seedlings can be planted by hand or with
machines, which makes labor and fuel prices important factors for forest landowners as
well. Costs besides those incurred during forest stand establishment depend on the
intermediate management strategies chosen. Some examples of intermediate management
costs are fire protection, thinning costs, boundary maintenance, management plans,
herbicide and fertilizer treatments, pruning, harvesting costs, and surveying (Bair & Alig,
2006). Certain costs can depend on the tree species. For example, seedling costs and
fertilizer recommendations vary amongst species. The United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and several land grant university extension services publish periodic
estimates of these costs. For this analysis, the extension services of the University of
Maryland, Pennsylvania State, Virginia Tech, the University of Arkansas, and the
University of Florida are used as data sources.
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Private landowners who want to dedicate their land to forestry may have access to
government cost-share programs. Such programs are in place to provide incentives for
landowners to dedicate their land to forestry because governments recognize the benefits
that forests provide, including those that help in the fight against climate change (Kooten,
Binkley, & Delcourt, 1995). This has a significant impact on the private costs of owning
forest. In some cases, 100% of the establishment costs are covered by the cost-share
program, making it much less costly for landowners. However, there are often constraints
to participating in such programs, such as long-term time commitments and eligibility
requirements. Details on the current forestry cost-share programs available to Maryland
landowners are included in the next chapter.
2.5.2

Private Benefits of Forestry

The main benefit that arises from forestry is the revenue from harvesting timber,
which can come from a commercial thinning or a final harvest. In estimating the benefits
from timber harvest, it is important to understand the distinctions between different
grades of timber and the prices associated with each. As a tree grows, its grade shifts
from pulpwood to sawtimber to veneer (Jacobson, 2008). However, certain species will
never reach the veneer grade, so that needs to be taken into account. Further, the species
is important in determining what the timber will likely be used for, which drastically
impacts the benefits from carbon sequestration. Tree growth data for this analysis was
obtained from the Forest Research Group, which is a private research organization in
Massachusetts, and from the United States Forest Service, which will be discussed in
detail in later chapters. Prices are commonly given in terms of volume, which could be
board feet, cords, or cubic feet. The most recent analysis of timber prices in the United
States conducted by the USDA includes real price projections to 2050 for hardwood and
softwood timber of different grades from different regions, which will be used in this
analysis (Haynes, 2003). While this publication may seem outdated, comparisons
between the price predictions and more recently observed prices provided some
validation for the predictions, which is discussed in more detail in the implementation
chapters.
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Another private benefit from forestry ownership is the aesthetic value of trees. The
Forest Service conducts a National Woodland Owner Survey every year, which acts as a
census of forest owners across the United States. When asked the question of the
importance of owning trees to enjoy their beauty or scenery, approximately 70% of the
forest owners that were surveyed answered “important” or “very important” (United
States Forest Service, 2014). McPherson, Simpson, Peper, Maco, and Xiao (2005)
included aesthetic benefits in their analysis of trees in five United States cities. They
calculated aesthetic benefits based on the contribution of a large tree in the front yard to a
house sale price in each city. Also, they take the distribution of street trees and the tree
growth rates into account for each city. Annual aesthetic benefits per tree range from $21
in Bismarck to $67 in Berkeley. These estimates are for urban trees, and this analysis is
focused on rural trees, for which aesthetic values are more difficult to quantify. While
timber revenues are much easier to monetize, aesthetic benefits are an important private
benefit as well. Several other co-benefits from forestry are presented in the next section.
2.5.3

Social Benefits of Forestry

Public, or social, benefits from forestry ownership are extensive. Besides carbon
sequestration, forests provide several co-benefits such as improved water quality,
improved air quality, increased shade and reduction of building temperatures, energy
savings, flood control, wildlife habitat preservation, and recreation opportunities. This
section discusses the valuation techniques that have been used in the literature for carbon
sequestration, improved air quality, and improved water quality as a result of forestry.
As already discussed, trees can sequester carbon from the atmosphere and store it in
their roots, trunks, branches and leaves over their lifetime. Nowak (1994b) conducted a
valuation of the reduction in atmospheric carbon by urban forests in Chicago. First
ground samples were collected for 8,996 trees in the study area including diameter at
breast height (dbh), tree height, and species. Allometric equations, which are equations
that relate the easily quantified characteristics of trees (such as height and species) with
more difficult properties (such as biomass), were used to calculate biomass for each tree.
Then, tree-growth was estimated based on measurement of growth increments. The
growth increments came from a sample of 543 trees removed in Chicago in the early
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1990’s that were measured to determine average annual growth for major tree species.
The result estimated that 5.6 million tons of carbon is stored in Chicago’s trees. The total
carbon storage can be monetized using the social costs of carbon estimates previously
discussed. Nowak’s study illustrates the fact that estimating the benefits from carbon
sequestration requires a large amount of ground sampling and historical growth data,
which can be costly and difficult to obtain. However, governments rely on such measures
for regulatory analysis, so these types of studies continue to be conducted.
Trees improve air quality in several ways. First, they can lower building
temperatures by shading, which can in turn lower building energy use (Nowak, 1994a).
This decrease in energy use can decrease power plant emissions. Trees can also intercept
particles from the atmosphere and absorb pollutants. Besides reducing carbon dioxide,
trees can also help decrease carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide,
and other particulate matter in the atmosphere. To estimate the removal of air pollutants
by trees, one must know the rate at which the surface of a tree cleans a given pollutant
from the air. Once the pollution removal by trees is known, the monetary value of the
pollutants removed is calculated by using the costs for emission control. In other words,
the cost of preventing the emission of the pollution by using control strategies is used as
the value of the pollutant removal by trees. Nowak uses the following 1990 dollar values
per metric ton of pollutant removed from the California Energy Commission: $490 for
ozone, $920 for carbon monoxide, $1,307 for particulate matter, $1,634 for sulfur
dioxide, and $4,412 for nitrogen dioxide. For an acre of trees in Chicago, the estimated
annual monetary value of pollution removal was $61 in 1991.
Improved water quality as a result of trees is often measured by the amount of
stormwater runoff reduction and monetized by using the costs for controlling stormwater
runoff. Stormwater runoff is the “second most common source of water pollution for
lakes and estuaries and the third most common source for rivers nationwide (Xiao,
McPherson, Simpson, & Ustin, 1998). Trees are capable of intercepting and storing
stormwater, which reduces runoff volumes. One way to monetize the costs for controlling
stormwater runoff is to sum the total money spent to store water in a basin instead
(McPherson et al., 2005). The costs would include acquiring retention basin land,
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maintenance, operations, and construction. McPherson et al. (2005) calculated a
stormwater reduction benefit ranging from $31 per tree in Glendale to $89 per tree in
Berkeley. Improved water quality also arises when forests filter pollutants such as
nitrogen and phosphorus that come from agricultural activities (Norton & Fisher, 2000).
The co-benefits from forestry are vast but very difficult to quantify and especially
to monetize, which becomes a limitation to evaluating forestry investments. Further,
many of the attempts to quantify co-benefits from forestry in the literature have been for
urban forests, as was presented in this section. Since this analysis considers rural forestry
investments, the estimates from the literature are not directly applicable. It is important to
note that only the benefits from permanently sequestered carbon are included in this
analysis, so the total social benefits from the forestry investments in question are likely
higher than the ones calculated.

2.6

Forestry Investment and Policy Literature

Econometric studies that explain the behavior and management decisions of forest
landowners and try to identify the determinants of certain forestry investments have been
conducted in the literature. Additionally, researchers have investigated the impacts of
government forestry programs on private landowner investment decisions.
Beach, Pattanayak, Yang, Murray, and Abt (2005) combined results from 39
econometric studies through a meta-analysis with the goal of identifying the determinants
of forest management by nonindustrial private forest owners. The meta-analysis
technique used was vote-counting, which is the process of categorizing the findings from
each study (significantly positive, significantly, negative, or not significant for each
variable) and the category with the most “votes” for each variable is determined to be the
best representation. Most of the studies used in their meta-analysis were from the United
States, with a few from other countries. The majority of the models were either binary
choice models that estimated the probability of a forest landowner making a certain
management decision (timber stand improvements, reforestation, or harvesting) or
ordinary least squares regressions that estimated the influence of the independent
variables on the amount of a management activity that took place (measured by acres).
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They used the following categorization of the determinants of forest management
decisions: market drivers, policy variables, owner characteristics, and plot conditions.
The main market driver that most studies included was timber prices, and surprisingly,
the percentage of studies that found a significantly positive effect on forest management
investment was lower than they expected. Plot size seemed to have a consistently positive
and significant effect on forest management investment, but owner characteristics did not
provide conclusive results across management practices. This suggests that forestry costshare programs might receive higher acreage participation if they were targeted towards
large landowners
The policy variables are of special importance to this analysis. Tax incentives, costshare programs, and technical assistance are typical examples of policy variables
included in the analysis of forestry investments. Beach et al. (2005) found that policy
variables were rarely included in harvesting studies, which makes sense since the purpose
of such programs is usually to incentivize reforestation and timber stand improvements,
not necessarily harvesting. The results regarding the impact of policy variables on the
decision to reforest or improve timber stands are shown in Table 2.3 and 2.4. A total of
16 reforestation studies and five timber stand improvement studies were used
Overall, they concluded that more empirical analyses found that landowners
respond to government programs than found that landowners respond to other factors,
such as market prices. However, the results showed that the frequency of significance
was higher for reforestation than for timber stand improvement. This may indicate that
cost-share assistance for reforestation would result in higher participation than for timber
stand improvements.
Table 2.4 Impact of Policy Variables on Reforestation Behavior

Policy Variables

Frequency of
Inclusion in Studies

Frequency of Positive Significance
(Out of total studies that included each
variable)

Cost-Share

80%

100%

Technical Assistance

29%

100%

Tax Incentives

18%

67%

(Beach et al., 2005)
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Table 2.5 Impact of Policy Variables on Timber Stand Improvement Behavior

Policy Variables

Frequency of
Inclusion in Studies

Frequency of Positive Significance
(Out of total studies that included each
variable)

Cost-Share

50%

50%

Technical Assistance

60%

67%

Tax Incentives

20%

100%

(Beach et al., 2005)

Most agree that government cost-share programs have a positive impact on the
forestry industry since timber production is a long-term commitment and incentives may
be required to encourage investment by landowners. However, some argue that such
programs do not induce additional investments in such activities as reforestation and
improved timber management, but instead, they replace the private capital that would
have been invested anyway. de Steiguer (1984) examined data from the participation of
10 states in two federal government forestry cost-share programs, the Federal Incentives
Program and the Agricultural Conservation Payments Program, to determine whether
these programs induced additional investments in forestry. Using regression analysis, he
estimated total private autonomous investment in tree planting as a function of personal
income, expected stumpage prices, expected interest rates, and total cost-share money
available for tree planting from the two cost-share programs mentioned above. He found
no evidence of capital substitution, and therefore, concluded by saying that the opponents
of forestry cost-share may not have a valid argument.
The majority of the past research focuses on landowners who have already invested
in forestry to try to explain and predict their behavior, some including government costshare programs and others without. This research analyzes the perspective of a private
landowner facing an investment decision to either establish new forestland or improve
existing forestland, and investigates the differences in investment decisions with and
without cost-share programs. The results will contribute to the question of whether costshare programs are only substituting capital that would have been invested in forestry
even in the absence of the program. Further, this analysis will explore the possibility of
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compensating private landowners not only by covering the costs of investing in forestry,
but also by subsidizing the carbon sequestration that results from their forestry
investment. The analysis is set in the state of Maryland, and the next chapter will present
an in-depth look at the cost-share programs currently available to landowners there and
their role in Maryland’s climate change policy.
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CHAPTER 3.

THE ROLE OF FORESTRY PROGRAMS IN MARYLAND’S
CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES

3.1

Maryland’s Climate Change Initiatives

Maryland’s GHGRP, passed in 2012, established an overall goal to reduce GHG
emissions by 25% (using 2006 as the base year) by 2020 (Department of the
Environment, 2013). According to the Maryland Department of the Environment (Air
and Radiation Management Administration, 2011), Maryland has one of the longest tidal
coastlines (behind Florida, California, and Louisiana), which makes it one of the states
that is most vulnerable to rising sea levels that result from climate change. There have
been 20 states, including Maryland, that have implemented GHG emissions targets
(Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015). The reduction goals across states
cannot be directly compared because they have different baseline years and target years.
However, for some perspective on Maryland’s progressive goals, the state of Connecticut
has a reduction target of 10% (using 1990 as the base year) by 2020. This is clearly a
much more conservative goal than the one Maryland has in place.
Maryland passed several pieces of legislation that led up to the GHGRP of 2012
(Air and Radiation Management Administration, 2011). The Healthy Air Act, passed in
2006, included a plan for Maryland to join RGGI. The Maryland Clean Cars Act, passed
in 2007, implemented stringent emissions standards, and EmPOWER Maryland, passed
in 2008, was designed to reduce electricity use by providing incentives for homeowners
to increase their energy efficiency. Further, the Maryland Renewable Energy Portfolio
Standard, amended in 2008, requires that 20% of the electricity used in Maryland must be
from renewable sources by 2022.
The GHGRP plan describes various programs in place to either reduce emissions or
for offsetting reductions. The programs are divided into the following categories: energy,
transportation, agriculture and forestry, zero waste, buildings, innovative initiatives, land
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use, and other. Specific to forestry, the action plan focuses on managing forests to capture
carbon, planting new forests, protecting wetlands to capture carbon, using biomass for
energy production, and increasing urban trees. The forestry and sequestration efforts are
projected to result in a reduction of 4.56 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions
in Maryland by 2020, which is 8.2% of the total reduction goal. In order to reach the
projected carbon emissions reduction from forestry and sequestration efforts, the DNR in
Maryland, with help from federal agencies such as the NRCS, has many forestry costshare programs in place.
Maryland’s land is currently around 40% forested, and in 2011, 89.4 million tons of
carbon was stored by forests in Maryland (Department of the Environment, 2013). Figure
3.1 shows the three physiographic regions in Maryland, which are determined by major
geologic landforms. Pine species are common in the Coastal Plain region and a mix of
northern hardwoods species are common in the Mountain and Piedmont regions
(Highfield and Sprague 2011).

Mountain
Piedmont

Coastal Plain

Figure 3.1 Maryland’s Physiographic Provinces (Highfield & Sprague, 2011)
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3.2

United States Forestry Cost-Share Programs

Forestry practices that are eligible for federal cost-share assistance are a subset of a
longer list of agricultural conservation practices. The federal conservation programs are
often intertwined, and this is by no means a comprehensive summary of all programs
available. This section presents the main program that offers cost-share assistance for
forestry practices to landowners in Maryland. Other programs such as the Conservation
Reserve Enhancement Program and the Agricultural Management Assistance Program
allow some forestry practices, but not nearly as extensively.
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), administered by the
NRCS, is a conservation program that provides financial assistance to agricultural
landowners, including forest landowners, to reduce pollution and improve the state of
natural resources in Maryland (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2015). The
program helps landowners plan and implement conservation practices, such as structural
changes or management changes, on agricultural or forested land. One of the national
priorities for EQIP is to increase biological carbon storage and sequestration, which is
directly relevant for forestry and climate change. The financial assistance is based on the
average cost to undergo the agreed upon conservation practices. Participants can have
varying contract lengths depending on the conservation practice, but total assistance is
limited to $300,000 per person over a six-year period. Examples of eligible conservation
practices that deal with forests are forest stand improvement, riparian forest buffers,
forest management plans, and tree and shrub site preparation and establishment. The
conservation practices must be maintained for the life span of the specific practice,
according to NRCS standards, which is 15 years for the forestry practices.
From 2009 to 2013, forest stand improvements have been conducted on 1,698
acres in Maryland (Morgart, 2014). Tree and shrub establishments have taken place on
344 acres, and 24 forest management plans have been executed through EQIP in
Maryland. These seem like small numbers, but it is important to remember that EQIP
focuses on many other conservation practices besides forestry. For the 2015 EQIP
participants, there are 98 eligible practices, with only five of them dealing with forestry.
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The average EQIP costs for forestry options relevant to this analysis will be included in a
later chapter that discusses data.

3.3

Maryland Forestry Cost-Share Programs

Maryland is perhaps one of the more progressive states when it comes to providing
cost-share assistance to landowners in order to incentivize forestry investments. A
detailed description of Maryland’s forestry cost-share programs is presented in this
section, followed by the results of a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analysis that
was conducted to shed some light on how much land in Maryland meets the eligibility
requirements for each program and what the carbon sequestration potential of that land is.
3.3.1

Woodland Incentive Program

The Woodland Incentive Program (WIP), administered by the Maryland DNR,
provides cost sharing to private woodland owners for planting new trees, site preparation,
and timber stand improvement (Maryland Forest Service, 2008). Anyone who owns
between 5 and 1,000 acres of woodland and agrees to uphold forestry practices for 15
years is eligible for this program. The program covers up to 65% of the costs incurred by
the private landowner for forest management, not to exceed $5,000 per year or $15,000 in
a 3-year period. The 65% payment is made only after the costs have been incurred by the
landowner. Eligible costs to improve woodland are thinning, pruning, prescribed burning,
crop tree release, site preparation for reforestation, herbicide treatments, and seedling
plantings. The program was put in place as a way of incentivizing the development and
management of private nonindustrial forests because they provide environmental
benefits, aesthetic benefits, and habitats for wildlife. From 2007 to 2014, 814 landowners
have participated in the program for management practices on 24,443 acres (Rider,
2014). The total cost-share assistance for these 814 participants was $834,803, which is
an average of $104,350 annually.
GIS Analysis was used to isolate any patches of land that meet the eligibility
requirements for WIP2. The data used for this analysis were from the Maryland Carbon
2.

Refer to the appendix for a detailed description of the GIS analysis
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Monitoring System (CMS) Database (Dubayah et al., 2013) and the Maryland Protected
Lands Map Server (Maryland iMAP, 2014). The CMS data layers used were a statewide
30 meter resolution canopy cover raster layer, which reports the percentage of canopy
cover for each cell and a statewide 90 meter resolution carbon sequestration potential
raster layer, which reports the difference between the total lifetime carbon sequestration
potential and the current aboveground biomass for each cell. The total lifetime carbon
sequestration potential was calculated using an ecosystem demography model, which
assumed that the entire state was restored to its natural vegetation of trees. The iMap data
layers used were a combination of layers showing land in Maryland that has already been
conserved in some way, including land that DNR owns and land under easements.
The process used to determine the patches of land that are eligible for WIP is
shown in Figure 3.2. First, the cells that were not already in a conservation program and
had a canopy cover of at least 95% were selected as eligible cells for WIP participation.
From the eligible cells, polygons of at least 5 acres were selected, and the carbon
sequestration potential statistics were calculated within the eligible polygons.
Eligible Cell Criteria:
-Conservation Layers = ‘0’ (not conserved)
-Canopy Cover = >=95%

Select Patches of Eligible Cells:
-Any eligible cell that was surrounded on
all sides by eligible cells was selected
-Each patch of eligible cells was converted
to a polygon
-All polygons >=5 acres were selected
Figure 3.2 WIP Eligibility According to GIS Criteria

The results showed a total of 736,761 acres of land in Maryland is eligible for WIP,
and the carbon sequestration potential (excluding current aboveground biomass) on this
land is approximately 138.8 million metric tons. To provide some context for these
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results, the size of Maryland is approximately 8 million acres, of which about 3 million
acres are forested, and Maryland emitted approximately 97 million metric tons of carbon
in 2013. In other words, about a year and a half’s worth of total emissions could be
sequestered on eligible WIP land.
The eligible land for WIP is much larger than the program participation that has
been observed. Perhaps, private landowners observe negative net present values of
improving timberland management, even with the cost-share assistance. The question of
whether it is due to the size of the cost-share assistance not being large enough will be
addressed in this analysis.
3.3.2

Lawn to Woodland

The L2W Initiative is a new program primarily aimed at afforestation, which is the
establishment of new forest cover. The program is a joint effort of Maryland DNR and
the Arbor Day Foundation. According to the advertisement materials for this new
program, Maryland has nearly one million acres of lawn that could potentially be
converted to forests (Maryland Forest Service, 2014). This program seeks to plant trees
on land that is currently lawn, and it fully funds the trees, tree planting, and monitoring
assistance. Any private landowner with more than one acre of turf qualifies for the
program. The program was launched in 2104 in four pilot counties, Montgomery,
Howard, Carroll, and Baltimore, and it is being extended statewide in 2015. In 2014, a
total of 4,300 trees were planted on 12 sites that totaled 14.6 acres in size (Feldt, 2014).
Again, GIS analysis was used to isolate patches of lawn that are eligible for this
program in Maryland, with a specific goal to see where the one million acres of lawn
estimate came from. The data used for this analysis were the same as for the WIP
analysis, with the addition of data from the National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD) (Jin et
al., 2013). The NLCD layer reports the land cover classification for each cell (total of 16
classifications).
The process used to determine the patches of land that are eligible for L2W is
shown in Figure 3.3. First, the cells that were not already in conservation programs, had
less than or equal to 30% canopy cover, and were classified as ‘21’ in the NLCD layer
were selected as eligible cells for L2W participation. Originally, 0% canopy cover was
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used as the eligibility criteria, but the resulting eligible acres was only around 28,000. In
reality, most lawn space would have a few trees on it, so 30% canopy cover was chosen
to account for that. The land cover classification of ‘21’ indicates ‘developed, open
space,’ which is what most large lawn spaces in the Maryland imagery layer were
classified as. It is by no means a perfect choice though because the ‘developed, open
space’ classification also includes land that is not lawn, such as baseball fields and golf
courses. However, a choice needed to be made in order to move forward with the
analysis. From the eligible cells, polygons of at least 1 acre were selected, and the carbon
sequestration potential statistics were calculated within the eligible polygons.
Eligible Cell Criteria:
-Conservation Layers = ‘0’ (not conserved)
-Canopy Cover <= 30%
-NLCD = ‘21’ (Developed Open Space)

Select Patches of Eligible Cells:
-Any eligible cell that was adjacent to at
least 3 other eligible cells was selected
-Each patch of eligible cells was converted
to a polygon
-All polygons >=1 acre were selected
Figure 3.3 L2W Eligibility According to GIS Criteria
The results showed a total of 230,450 acres of land in Maryland is eligible for L2W,
and the carbon sequestration potential (excluding aboveground biomass) on this land is
approximately 301.6 million metric tons, which is equivalent to about three years of
Maryland’s annual emissions. You can see that this result is much lower than the one
million acre estimate, which could be due to differences in the GIS analyses approaches.
However, the enormous difference in estimates raises some concerns. Perhaps the state
overestimated the amount of eligible land for this new program. However, the great effort
that the state of Maryland makes to promote new forest cover and improve management
on existing forest cover is undeniable, regardless of the discrepancies in estimated
eligible land.
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CHAPTER 4.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS APPLIED TO FORESTRY
INVESTMENTS

4.1

Components Critical to Forestry Investments

Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a well-known method for evaluating alternative
investments and can be used to analyze forestry investment scenarios. This research will
use CBA to evaluate forestry investments, specifically focusing on the differences in
returns with and without participation in a government cost-share program. There are a
few aspects of CBA that are critical to forestry investments, which will be the focus of
this chapter. Specifically, since forestry is an abnormally long term investment,
discounting plays a very important role in the analysis. We already saw the role that
discounting plays in estimating the social cost of carbon as well. Also, there are different
methods for determining the optimal rotation length, which can change the results. A
brief description of the scenarios and sensitivity analysis conducted in this research is in
order as well.

4.2

Discounting and its Impact on Forestry Investments

As previously stated, the discount rate reflects the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption now and consumption in the future. It is used to calculate the net
present value of a stream of future costs and benefits (Greenstone et al., 2013). The
further the benefits and costs occur in the future, the lower their present value today. This
becomes especially important for forestry investments because the majority of the costs,
such as establishment costs and fertilizer treatments, are incurred towards the beginning
of the time horizon and the benefits from harvesting timber occur much later. When a
landowner is faced with the decision to invest in something that has substantial upfront
costs and no benefits until year 20, it does not seem very appealing. However, people
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continue to invest in forestry, which could be attributed to the co-benefits that forestry
provides, such as aesthetic value, lower pollution levels, and carbon storage.
Choosing the appropriate discount rate for forestry investments is a somewhat
controversial matter. As the discount rate increases, the less the future is valued. Kula
(1988) pointed out that discounting easily wipes away the future benefits from harvesting
timber, even though the risk that forestry investments will become worthless someday in
the future is very low. Because of this, some argue that forestry investments should be
discounted at an especially low rate. However, choosing a specific discount rate just to
make an investment look appealing does not seem like the best approach, especially since
one could also argue that investing in forestry can come with substantial risks. Such risks
might include fluctuating future prices of timber, fire damage, wildlife damage, invasive
species, and wind or other weather damage. Perhaps forestry investments should be
discounted the same as any other investment. Moreover, discounting is about the
opportunity cost of investing elsewhere, and such alternatives are relevant for forestry
investments as well
The damages from GHG emissions occur over several decades and the same
concerns about the longevity of the analysis are evident for estimating the social cost of
carbon as estimating the private returns from a forestry investment. Consequently, it
makes sense that the discount rates chosen for this analysis are based on those used by an
interagency working group consisting of several agencies including the EPA and the
USDA to estimate the social cost of carbon (2.5%, 3%, and 5%) (Greenstone et al.,
2013). The two higher discount rates (3% and 5%) were chosen to represent historically
observed interest rates. The 2.5% discount rate was chosen to represent the concern that
interest rates over time are uncertain and to incorporate the common environmentalist
view that future outcomes matter.
Recent low interest rates suggest that 2.5% may actually be the most accurate
discount rate for social CBA. The interest rate on a 30-year treasury bill on March 13th,
2015 was 2.7% (United States Department of the Treasury, 2015). However, private
discount rates are likely higher than social discount rates because interest rates on private
investments such as land and home mortgages are higher. Further, private interest rates
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include a risk premium in addition to valuing current versus future consumption.
GreenStone Farm Credit Services, which is one of the largest rural lenders in the United
States, currently offers an interest rate between 4.3% and 6.8% for 30-year fixed
mortgages on rural homes (GreenStone Farm Credit Services, 2015). The interest rate
offered on a 30-year fixed loan for a parcel of land over 10 acres is between 5.3% and
7.8%. These higher values suggest that the 5% discount rate may be the best rate for the
private CBA, and it might actually be a lower bound for the actual private discount rate
depending on the risk preferences of the landowner. The concept of private impatience
becomes evident when discussing the difference between the social and private discount
rates. From a social planner’s point of view (government’s point of view), the time
horizon in consideration is much longer than that of a private individual. Because of this,
private individuals are less patient than social planners and therefore their discount rate is
higher.
Results of this research will be presented using all three discount rates (2.5%, 3%,
and 5%), which will also serve as an illustration for how much discounting impacts the
analysis of forestry investments. The distinction between typical private and social
discount rates will also be used to interpret the analysis results. Specifically, 2.5% will
represent a typical social discount rate, and 5% will represent a typical private discount
rate. For each discount rate, an NPV will be calculated with and without the forestry
investment in question. Equation 1 shows the NPV formula used for a typical forestry
investment, which is the basis for the private CBA conducted in this research.
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Equation 2 shows the inclusion of benefits from carbon sequestration that result from the
forestry investment, which is the basis for the social CBA conducted in this research.
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(2)
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4.3

Determining the Optimal Rotation Length

The decision on when to harvest timber depends first on the optimization objective
of the landowner. The two objectives that a landowner can have are to maximize long-run
growth (a biological optimum) or to maximize long-run net revenue (an economic
optimum). Another way of looking at the differing objectives is to think of the biological
optimum as maximizing carbon sequestration and the economic optimum as maximizing
timber harvest net returns. Economic maturity of forests generally occurs sooner than
biological maturity because the economic optimum accounts for the concept of earning
interest on the forest investment (Jacobson, 2008). In other words, calculating the
biological optimum rotation does not take into consideration that you could invest your
money elsewhere. Different rotation lengths result depending on which optimization
objective is used. However, you will see in the analysis results that the difference
between the biological and economic rotations depends heavily on the species and growth
rates of the stand.
4.3.1

Biological Rotation

Forest stand growth is commonly expressed in terms of volume per acre per year.
Growth is not constant over the lifetime of a tree. Rather, it grows at an increasing rate
for a period of time and slows to a decreasing growth rate, producing an S-shaped graph.
The point when the growth rate is zero is called the biological maximum age. This
concept is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 Representative Tree Growth Cycle (Kula, 1988)
Between 0 and α, the tree is growing at an increasing rate; between α and β, the tree
is growing at a decreasing rate; and at β, the biological maximum is achieved because the
growth rate is zero. When volume growth per acre is averaged over the life of the stand,
the result is called the mean annual increment (MAI). The MAI is calculated each year by
taking the total volume of the stand divided by the age of the stand. The year in which the
MAI is maximized is the optimal biological rotation, and the yield that year is called the
maximum sustained yield (MSY) (Jacobson, 2008). No costs or benefits are taken into
account when calculating the optimal biological rotation. Because of this, harvesting at
the biological rotation definitely maximizes the physical harvest volume, but it might
result in lower returns than the economically optimal rotation.
4.3.2

Economic Rotation

Financial maturity of a forest stand usually occurs earlier than biological maturity
(Jacobson, 2008). The difference between the optimal biological rotation and the optimal
economic rotation depends on the growth rate of the timber and the alternative rate of
return. When these two rates equal each other, it is the optimal time to harvest timber.

38
This method of solving for the optimal rotation age is also known as maximizing the land
expectation value (LEV), which was first proposed by Faustmann (1849). The LEV is the
net present value (NPV) of a stream of net revenues from an infinite series of optimal
timber rotations. This optimal economic rotation is commonly known as the Faustmann
rotation. Figure 4.2 illustrates the difference in rotation length between the optimal
biological rotation and the optimal economic or “financial” rotation.
The optimal economic rotation will be the primary rotation used for this analysis,
but a discussion of how the biological and economic rotations differ will be included as
well. In Figure 4.2, the difference between the two rotation lengths looks quite
substantial, which is not always the case (as mentioned earlier). In one of the analysis
scenarios, the optimal rotations are only one year apart, but in the other scenario the
economic optimum occurs 20 years before the biological optimum. The difference lies in
the varying growth rates of the tree species.
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Figure 4.2 Tree Volume Growth and the Optimal Rotations (Jacobson, 2008)
4.4

The With and Without Analysis Process

The costs and benefits associated with making a forestry investment vary
significantly based on the investment in question. An overview of the important costs and
benefits to consider was presented already in the section on forestry and alternative land
uses. This section presents an overview of the steps involved in using CBA to analyze
forestry investment scenarios. An explanation of how our data are used to implement the
relevant costs and benefits for our scenarios is discussed in the next chapter.

40
One of the basic approaches to the benefit-cost analysis process is the with-andwithout approach (Campbell & Brown, 2003). This approach includes opportunity costs,
which are an important concept in cost-benefit analysis. Undertaking an investment in
forestry means you are giving up the opportunity to do something else with your land.
The opportunity cost is quantified in the ‘without’ portion of this approach. If the
investment benefits from the ‘with’ analysis are greater than the investment opportunity
costs in the ‘without’ analysis, the investment should be made. In this research, a third
result is added to the traditional with-and-without approach. For each investment, there
will be two results for the ‘with’ analysis: one assuming that the landowner participates in
a forestry cost-share program and one where they do not participate. For each of the three
scenarios, there is an appropriate forestry cost-share program that the landowner would
be eligible for. An overview of the three scenarios follows.

4.5

Forestry Investment Scenarios and Sensitivity Analysis

The next three chapters present a detailed description of how CBA was used to
assess the three forestry investment scenarios presented in Table 4.1. Each scenario
coincides with one of the forestry cost-share programs discussed earlier.
To test how sensitive the investment decisions are to the discount rate chosen,
results will be presented using the three discount rates discussed in a previous section
(2.5%, 3%, and 5%). In addition, sensitivity analysis of the carbon price used to calculate
benefits from carbon sequestration will be conducted. Specifically, results will be
presented using the actual carbon price from the California Cap-and-Trade Program to
calculate the benefits from carbon sequestration. These results will be compared to results
using the social cost of carbon estimates, as calculated by the Interagency Working
Group discussed earlier, to calculate the benefits from carbon sequestration. The
appropriate social cost of carbon will be used for each discount rate, since the choice of
discount rates for this analysis was based off the rates used to report the social cost of
carbon estimates. Scenario specific sensitivity analysis is conducted as well. For example,
sensitivity analysis on the cost of pre-commercial thinning in the improving timber
management scenario is conducted due to the large variability in costs.
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Table 4.1 Overview of Forestry Investment Scenarios
Forestry Investment

Overview of Scenario
•
•
•

Improving Timber
Management
•
•

Conversion from
Agricultural Land to
Forest

Conversion from
Lawn to Forest

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

30 acres
4-year-old loblolly pine stand
Participate in WIP: Pre-commercially thin pine stand at
age 4 (year 0 in this scenario), 65% of thinning costs
covered
Timber sold as pulpwood
Carbon sequestration calculated using conversion
factors for softwoods in the Northeastern United States
17 acres
Cropland and pastureland separately considered
Oak/hickory stand establishment
Participate in EQIP: Cost-share based on average costs
for high density, mechanical tree planting
Timber sold as sawtimber
Carbon sequestration calculated using conversion
factors for hardwoods in the Northeastern United States
1 acre
Oak/Hickory stand establishment
Participate in L2W: 100% of establishment costs
covered
Timber sold as sawtimber
Carbon sequestration calculated using conversion
factors for hardwoods in the Northeastern United States
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CHAPTER 5.

IMPROVING TIMBER MANAGEMENT: IMPLEMENTATION
AND RESULTS

5.1

Scenario Overview

The setting for this scenario is a private landowner in Wicomico County, Maryland
who owns 30 acres of loblolly pine that was naturally regenerated following a seed tree
harvest four years earlier. Naturally regenerated stands utilize the seeds from existing
trees leftover from the previous harvest (Cunningham, Barry, & Walkingstick, 2008).
The landowner is facing the decision of whether or not to improve management of the
stand by pre-commercially thinning. Pre-commercial thinning of loblolly pine stands is
recommended to be conducted in the first three or four years of growth for the best results
(Williams, Bohn, McKeithen, & Demers, 2011), which is the basis for assuming the
investment occurs in year four.
Pre-commercial thinning is an eligible practice for WIP, which is a program in
Maryland that provides cost-share assistance for the improvement of existing timber
stands. Historical data showing participation in WIP between 2007 and 2014 reports that
the average number of acres amongst program participants is 29.78 (Rider, 2014).
The base case for this scenario, also called the ‘without’ case, assumes that the
landowner does not pre-commercially thin the stand. Two ‘with’ cases result from this
scenario: one assuming the landowner pre-commercially thins without receiving costshare assistance from WIP and one assuming the landowner pre-commercially thins and
participates in WIP. Each piece of individual data needed for the CBA is presented in
detail, followed by the results showing the NPVs of net revenue streams under different
assumptions, from the year the pre-commercial thinning investment is made to the year of
the economically optimal timber harvest.
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5.2

Loblolly Pine Growth Function

Loblolly Pine is a common species in the Coastal Plain of Maryland (Highfield &
Sprague, 2011). Refer back to Figure 3.1 for an illustration of Maryland’s physiographic
regions (defined by major geologic landforms).
According to a University of Maryland extension publication about forest thinning,
the main benefit from pre-commercial thinning is improved timber quality (Stewart &
Dawson, 2013). Improved timber quality arises because pre-commercial thinning
removes the inferior trees, which leaves the remaining trees with more resources,
allowing them to grow faster and larger. Pre-commercial thinning is especially important
for naturally regenerated loblolly pine stands because it is common for pine stands to
produce seeds at a very high rate, which leads to overstocked stands (Williams et al.,
2011). Growth curves illustrating the concept that pre-commercially thinned loblolly pine
stands result in greater timber volumes at harvest are presented next.
5.2.1

Growth without Pre-commercial Thinning

The growth function for a loblolly pine stand that has not been pre-commercially
thinned was taken from a Forest Research Group publication (Lutz, 2011). The annual
volume in tons per acre for the first 40 years was reported. The growth estimates were
developed by averaging several growth curves from different forest owners. It is
specified that no thinnings were applied on this hypothetical stand. For different stages of
the analysis, the timber volume needs to be in cubic feet per acre (to convert to carbon
per acre) and cords per acre (to sell as pulpwood). The appropriate volume conversion
factors are shown below (Nix, 2015). A common measurement for timber volume is
board feet, which is a board that is one foot in length, one foot wide, and one inch thick.
One thousand board feet is abbreviated as MBF. It was necessary to convert tons per acre
into MBF per acre first because of the available conversion factors.
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 7.5 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
183 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
(3)
�
÷
�×
=
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 7.5 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
2.8 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
(4)
�
÷
�×
=
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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5.2.2

Growth with Pre-commercial Thinning

The growth function for a loblolly pine stand that has been pre-commercially
thinned was taken from a Forest Service publication that reports regional cost information
for different timberland management practices, as well as justifications for investing in
timberland management, such as pre-commercial thinning (Bair & Alig, 2006). The
volume in cubic feet per acre in five year increments for a pine stand that had been precommercially thinned was reported, and a fitted equation was used to fill in the annual
volume measures. Since the volume measures were already in cubic feet per acre, they
only had to be converted to cords per acre (using equation 2 above).
Table 5.1 shows the volume measures in cords per acre with and without precommercial thinning that are used in this analysis, and Figure 5.2 shows the plotted
volume curves for the values in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 Loblolly Pine Volume Measures Used
(cords/acre)
Year

Without PreCommercial
Thinning

With PreCommercial
Thinning

1

0

0

2

2.6

0

3

3.6

0.5

4

4.8

2.7

5

6.3

6.0

6

8.2

10.0

7

10.8

14.7

8

14.0

19.8

9

17.2

25.1

10

20.3

30.7

11

23.3

36.2

12

26.3

41.6

13

29.2

46.9

14

31.9

52.0

15

34.6

56.7

16

37.1

61.2

17

39.5

65.2

18

41.9

68.9

19

44.1

72.2

20

46.2

75.1

21

48.2

77.6

22

50.2

79.7

Adapted from Lutz (2011) and Bair and Alig (2006)
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Figure 5.1 Volume Curves for Loblolly Pine Stands: With and Without Pre-commercial
Thinning
Adapted from Lutz (2011) and Bair and Alig (2006)
5.3

Management Costs

The only management cost that is different between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases
in this scenario is the inclusion of pre-commercial thinning cost. Other management costs
including fertilizer, herbicide, and miscellaneous management costs would also be
incurred by the landowner, but those would not change with the decision to precommercially thin. Since the investment in question is pre-commercial thinning, that is
the only cost that needs to be considered in the analysis. The analysis is done in real 2010
dollars, so all of the costs and benefits are converted according to the Producer Price
Index (PPI) for all commodities (United States Bureau of Labor FRED Economic Data,
2015). The Producer Price Index measures average changes in over one thousand
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commodity prices including prices of sawtimber, pulpwood, and other wood products,
which makes it suitable for forestry analyses (Gunter & Haney Jr, 1984).
The Alabama Cooperative Extension System (Alabama A&M University and
Auburn University) conducts a survey of forest landowners in the Southern United States
every two years, in which respondents are asked to report their major forestry costs
(Dooley & Barlow, 2013). Maryland is included in the states that are surveyed. The most
recent published survey results are from 2012, from which the average pre-commercial
thinning cost per acre was taken. The authors noted a large variance in responses for precommercial thinning costs, from $38 to $236 per acre. I used the average of these two
values, which is $137 per acre ($125. 14 per acre in 2010 dollars). Since the range of precommercial thinning costs is so large, sensitivity analysis is conducted using the two
extremes. The cost is incurred in year zero (stand is four years old) for the ‘with’ cases.

5.4

Optimal Rotation and Timber Benefits

The difference between the optimal biologic and economic rotations was
previously discussed. The biologically optimal rotation maximizes the mean annual
increment (MAI) in tree volume, and it does not take any costs or benefits into
consideration. The maximized MAI in this scenario occurs when the stand is 26 years old
without pre-commercial thinning and at 23 years old with pre-commercial thinning. The
difference in rotation lengths is attributed to the accelerated growth that follows precommercial thinning, which leads to a shorter rotation length.
For the analysis, the economically optimal rotation lengths were used since the
landowner’s objective is to maximize timber profits. Faustmann’s formula (below) that
calculates the land expectation value (LEV) was used to determine the optimal economic
rotation lengths with and without pre-commercial thinning (Faustmann, 1849). The LEV
is an estimate of the net present value (NPV), using continuous discounting, of a stream
of net revenues from rotations to infinity.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = −𝐶𝐶 + [(𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶] �

Equation 5 simplifies to Equation 6:

1
1
1
+ 𝑟𝑟2𝑡𝑡 + 𝑟𝑟3𝑡𝑡 … �
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒
𝑒𝑒

(5)
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𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = −𝐶𝐶 +

𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶
𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 1

(6)

C in the equation above is the stand regeneration cost, which was obtained from the
same Forest Service publication as the loblolly pine growth with pre-commercial thinning
data (Bair & Alig, 2006). This publication reports regional cost estimates, which were
produced by combining current and past prices, as well as prices for labor and fuel. For
the Northeast region, the stand establishment costs for naturally regenerated softwood
stands was estimated to be $92 per acre ($129.61 per acre in 2010 dollars).
V(t) is the stumpage value when the stand is t years old. It is calculated by
multiplying the stumpage price (in dollars per cord) by the timber volume in year t (in
cords per acre). Stumpage prices are the prices that a logging company pays a landowner
for the right to harvest their standing trees (J. S. Kays & Bittenbender, 2012). Harvesting
costs such as cutting and hauling are already accounted for in stumpage prices. A Forest
Service publication that analyzes the United States timber situation from 1952 to 2050
reports historic stumpage prices by region and estimates price projections to 2050
(Haynes, 2003). The 2003 publication is the most recent comprehensive Forest Service
report of stumpage prices, which may seem outdated. However, since stumpage prices
are determined on a case by case basis by logging companies, they are difficult to report
on a frequent basis. The University of Maryland extension service no longer reports
stumpage prices (as of 2006), and the closest extension services that do are Penn State
and West Virginia University. When looking at their most recent stumpage prices reports,
the number of observations raised some concerns. For example, in the most recent West
Virginia price report (December 2014), the stumpage price for softwood pulpwood in the
region closest to Maryland was $10.71 per cord ($9.63 per cord in 2010 dollars), but it is
only based on the results of one survey (Appalacian Hardwood Center, 2014). I decided
to use the 2003 Forest Service publication because it combined the results of small
surveys such as the one in West Virginia to produce more robust stumpage price
estimates. In addition, the price used from Haynes (2003) for softwood pulpwood was
$9.24 per cord, which is actually very close to the one survey observation from West
Virginia.
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Loblolly pine is the primary tree species used by the paper industry, so I assumed
that the harvested timber is sold as pulpwood (Cubbage et al., 2009). Real stumpage price
increases are predicted to be quite substantial. The softwood pulpwood stumpage price is
predicted to increase in real terms from $9.24 per cord in 2010 to $36.94 per cord in 2050
(in 2010 dollars). The drastic increases are estimated to happen between 2030 and 2050
due to a projected tightening supply of pulpwood. However, since real increases in other
components such as regeneration and management costs are not considered in this
analysis, I will assume that there are no real increases in stumpage prices. I used the 2010
real softwood pulpwood stumpage price of $9.24 per cord to calculate V(t). This equation
was also used to calculate timber benefits from harvesting. In reality, a few trees per acre
would be left to provide seed trees for natural regeneration, but that was not accounted
for in the calculation of timber benefits since the difference would be minimal.
r is the discount rate, which in the base case is 3%. The discount rate of 3% was
chosen because it is the middle value of the three discount rates considered in this
analysis (2.5%, 3%, and 5%).
The LEV using Equation 6 was calculated for each year (with and without precommercial thinning), assuming the harvest occurred in that year. The year with the
highest LEV was chosen as the optimal economic rotation length. The resulting optimal
economic rotation lengths were age 25 without pre-commercial thinning and age 22 with
pre-commercial thinning. Both economic rotation lengths are one year less than the
respective biological rotation lengths. Since loblolly pine stands grow so quickly, the
difference between the economic and biological rotations is minimal. However, in the
case of an oak/hickory stand, which is presented in the next scenario, the difference is
much larger.

5.5

Woodland Incentive Program Participation

Thinning is one of the eligible improved management practices that receives costshare assistance from WIP. WIP covers up to 65% of the costs of the improved
management, so I assumed that 65% of the pre-commercial thinning costs were
reimbursed to the landowner in the case with WIP participation. The total WIP cost-share
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assistance per acre is $81.34 when the average pre-commercial thinning cost of $125.14
per acre is used. The WIP cost-share assistance is adjusted to be 65% of the two extreme
pre-commercial thinning costs used for sensitivity analysis as well. The resulting cost
shares are $22.56 per acre using the minimum pre-commercial thinning cost and $140.12
per acre using the maximum. The WIP cost-share assistance was adjusted because the
amount of cost-share the landowner receives is determined after the costs are incurred,
and it is based on the payment receipts for the management practice undergone as part of
the program.

5.6

Carbon Sequestration Benefits

The benefits from carbon sequestration were calculated using a sequence of
conversions that result in the metric tons of carbon per acre that remain permanently
sequestered in harvested wood products. The first step was to convert merchantable
timber volume (in cubic feet per acre) into total above and below ground volume. The
ratio of total above and below ground volume to merchantable volume for softwood
species in the Northeast region is 2.193 (Birdsey, 1992). The second step was to convert
the total volume (in cubic feet per acre) to pounds of carbon per acre. The factor to
convert loblolly pine in the Northeast region from total volume to carbon is 15.28
(Birdsey, 1992). The common measurement for carbon is metric tons, which is the unit
that the social cost of carbon is reported in. To convert carbon from pounds to metric
tons, pounds are multiplied by 0.00045359 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2004).
The next step was to calculate the percentage of the carbon that actually remains
sequestered in the harvested wood products. The process in California Cap-and-Trade
Program’s forest offset protocol was used to estimate carbon in wood products (Air
Resources Board, 2011). To account for carbon that is lost during harvest and in the
processing of wood products, mill efficiency measures were calculated by the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) for each state. The mill efficiency factor for softwood
pulpwood in Maryland is 51.3%, which means 48.7% of the original carbon sequestered
is lost before it can be transferred to wood products. The mill efficiency factors vary from
about 50% to 70% across states. Any carbon that remains sequestered in in-use wood
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products or in landfills for at least 100 years is considered to be permanent by CARB.
Examples of in-use wood products are furniture, paper products, and wood used in
construction. Smith, Heath, Skog, and Birdsey (2006) estimated the average carbon
disposition patterns for saw logs and pulpwood for the United States by regions. For
softwood pulpwood in the Northeast region, 0.6% remains in in-use wood products after
100 years, and 8.4% remains in landfills after 100 years. A total of 9% of the original
carbon sequestered by the loblolly pine stand remains permanently sequestered, so that is
what was used to calculate the carbon benefits.
The equation below shows the process of converting timber volume in cubic feet
per acre to metric tons of carbon permanently sequestered per acre.
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
× 2.193 × 15.28 =
× 0.00045359
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
=
× 51.3% × 9%
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
(7)
=
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

As previously discussed, the inclusion of carbon benefits using the Interagency
Working Group’s social cost of carbon estimates will be compared to the inclusion of
carbon benefits using the carbon price from the California Cap-and-Trade Program. The
2015 social cost of carbon estimates in 2010 dollars using 2.5%, 3%, and 5% as discount
rates are $60.96, $39.57, and $11.76 per metric ton respectively (Interagency Working
Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). As mentioned earlier, these social cost of carbon
estimates increase over time (see Table 2.1). The carbon benefits are quantified here
using both constant social cost of carbon estimates with the 2015 values and increasing
social cost of carbon benefits with the corresponding annual value each year. The
California carbon price on March 9th, 2015 was $12.63 per metric ton, which is $12.14
per metric ton in real 2010 dollars (Climate Policy Iniative, 2015).The California carbon
price is very similar to the social cost of carbon estimate using the highest discount rate,
which is illustrated in the results.
The tons of carbon sequestered per acre each year were adjusted to determine how
much would remain permanently sequestered based on the conversion factors in Equation
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7. The social cost of carbon estimates and the carbon price were multiplied by the annual
incremental metric tons of permanently sequestered carbon per acre to calculate the
annual carbon benefit, which is then discounted appropriately in the final NPV
calculation for each case. In other words, the annual carbon benefit is only based on the
carbon that remains permanently sequestered, and the temporary carbon sequestration is
not valued. The debate about whether temporary carbon sequestration should be viewed
as a way of mitigating climate change is ongoing. Kirschbaum (2006) claimed that
temporary carbon sequestration achieves very little impact on mitigating climate change
and should therefore not be incentivized by policy. In response to Kirschbaum’s paper,
Dornburg and Marland (2008) argued that temporary carbon sequestration reduces carbon
in the atmosphere in the short run, which helps “buy time” to pursue long term mitigation
strategies. Since California’s forestry offset protocol does not value temporary carbon
sequestration, I chose to do the same.

5.7

Base Case Results

The net revenue each year was calculated by subtracting the annual costs from the
annual benefits. There are no quantified private benefits until the harvest year, so the net
revenues are negative up to that point. The NPV is the discounted value of the stream of
net revenues from the year of the investment (year zero in this case) to the harvest year
(year 21 without pre-commercial thinning and year 18 with pre-commercial thinning). It
is important to remember that the loblolly pine stand is already four years old in year zero
of this scenario, so the optimal rotation lengths are four years longer than the number of
years between the pre-commercial thinning investment and the harvest.
It should be noted that net revenues from timber are taxed using capital gains tax
rates since timber is a long-term investment. The results shown here are before taxes are
subtracted, since including taxes would not alter any investment decisions. The results
would decrease proportionately depending on which tax bracket the landowner falls into.
The base case results are shown in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2 Improving Timber Management Results: Base Case NPVs
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Without
Pre-Commercial
Thinning

With
Pre-Commercial
Thinning

With
Pre-Commercial
Thinning & WIP

2.5%

$265.25

$282.74

$364.09

3%

$239.49

$248.54

$329.88

5%

$159.91

$139.20

$220.54

It is important to note that the NPVs in Table 5.2 only include the pre-commercial
thinning costs, so the actual net returns to the landowner would be different than these
since they would pay the establishment and management costs as well. However, the
investment in question is pre-commercial thinning, not the question of whether to allocate
land to forest. The landowner had already decided to forest the land four years ago. As
expected, the NPV with pre-commercial thinning and participation in WIP is higher.
Even though all of the NPVs are positive, the interesting question is whether the NPVs
with pre-commercial thinning are greater than those without pre-commercial thinning.
This will differ depending on which discount rate is used.

5.8

Discount Rate Sensitivity Results

The difference between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases are reported in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Additional NPV from PreCommercial Thinning

Additional NPV from PreCommercial Thinning & WIP

2.5%

$17.49

$98.93

3%

$9.05

$90.39

5%

($20.72)

$60.62

One can see that the discount rate makes a substantial difference in the landowner’s
decision of whether to pre-commercially thin. With a discount rate of 5% and no
participation in WIP, the NPV without pre-commercial thinning is higher than the NPV
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with pre-commercial thinning. As discussed earlier, 2.5% is expected to be the best
representation of a social discount rate, and 5% is closer to a private discount rate. With
that assumption, private forest landowners would not choose to invest in pre-commercial
thinning without cost-share assistance from WIP. With participation in WIP, the returns
per acre from pre-commercial thinning are greater than those without thinning for all
discount rates. The program seems to provide enough for the landowner to invest in precommercial thinning, but it may depend on the pre-commercial thinning costs.

5.9

Pre-Commercial Thinning Cost Sensitivity Results

The survey results reporting the per acre pre-commercial thinning costs used for
this analysis ranged from $38 per acre to $236 per acre ($34.71 and $215.57 per acre in
real 2010 dollars) (Dooley & Barlow, 2013). For the base case, the average of $125.14
per acre was used, but the wide uncertainty in pre-commercial thinning costs raises some
concerns. Table 5.4 reports the difference between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases for the
two extremes of the pre-commercial thinning cost per acre. The pre-commercial thinning
costs are labeled minimum ($34.71 per acre), average ($125.14 per acre), and maximum
($215.57 per acre) in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs for Different PreCommercial Thinning Costs
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

2.5%

3%

5%

Pre-Commercial
Thinning Cost Per
Acre

Additional NPV from
Pre-Commercial
Thinning

Additional NPV from
Pre-Commercial
Thinning & WIP

Minimum

$107.92

$130.48

Average

$17.49

$98.83

Maximum

($72.94)

$67.18

Minimum

$99.48

$122.04

Average

$9.05

$90.39

Maximum

($81.38)

$58.74

Minimum

$69.71

$92.28

Average

($20.72)

60.62

Maximum

($111.15)

$28.97
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As expected the minimum reported pre-commercial thinning cost per acre yielded
the highest NPVs and the maximum reported pre-commercial thinning cost per acre
yielded the lowest NPVs. With the maximum pre-commercial thinning cost and no costshare assistance from WIP, the NPV is negative for all three discount rates. However, for
a discount rate of 5%, participation in WIP just barely outweighs the high percommercial thinning cost with an NPV of just $28.97 per acre. Even with cost-share
assistance from WIP, the landowner may choose not to invest in pre-commercial thinning
if the costs are at the maximum. The variability in pre-commercial thinning costs
definitely makes a different in the investment decision.

5.10 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results
The results below include potential compensation for carbon that remains
permanently sequestered as a result of investing in pre-commercial thinning. The NPVs
reported in Table 5.5 and 5.6 are the difference between the NPVs with pre-commercial
thinning and carbon benefits and the ones without pre-commercial thinning in Table 5.2.
The carbon benefits in Table 5.5 were calculated using the California carbon price, and
those in Table 5.6 were calculated using both the constant and increasing social cost of
carbon estimates for all three discount rates.
Table 5.5 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs Including Carbon
Benefits based on California Carbon Price
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Additional NPV from PreCommercial Thinning &
Carbon Benefits

Additional NPV from PreCommercial Thinning, WIP, &
Carbon Benefits

2.5%

$46.73

$128.08

3%

$36.80

$118.15

5%

$1.93

$83.27
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Table 5.6 Improving Timber Management Results: Difference in NPVs Including Carbon
Benefits based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

2.5%
3%
5%

Inclusion of the
Social Cost of
Carbon Estimates

Additional NPV from
Pre-Commercial
Thinning & Carbon
Benefits

Additional NPV from PreCommercial Thinning,
WIP, & Carbon Benefits

Constant

$164.31

$245.65

Increasing

$197.70

$279.04

Constant

$99.49

$180.83

Increasing

$125.57

$206.91

Constant

$1.22

$82.57

Increasing

$7.89

$89.23

The interpretation of Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 depends largely on the initial goals
for WIP. If the original goal when implementing the program was to increase carbon
sequestration, then the cost-share assistance would already be based on the carbon
benefits. This would mean that the last column in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 would be
double counting the carbon benefits. The main goal of WIP was to “foster and encourage
the development, management, and protection of the nonindustrial private woodlands”
(Maryland Forest Service, 2008). The co-benefits of forestry such as environmental,
wildlife, and aesthetic benefits are cited in the program information as well, but they are
not at the forefront. This may indicate that the last column is not double counting
anything, since the current cost-share assistance is likely not based on societal benefits
from carbon sequestration.
For the 2.5% and 3% discount rate results, the carbon benefits using the social cost
of carbon are much higher than those that use the California carbon price. However, the
5% discount rate results are almost identical. This is a clear illustration of the importance
of discounting in both the calculation of the social cost of carbon and in the calculation of
the discounted net returns for this scenario. With the inclusion of carbon benefits, the
NPVs with pre-commercial thinning are all positive, even without participation in WIP.
However, at a discount rate of 5% and no participation in WIP, the NPVs are less than
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$2.00 per acre, which highlights the extent of private impatience in this scenario. Looking
at the 2.5% discount rate results when carbon benefits are included, the investment in precommercial thinning is definitely worth it from society’s perspective. It seems like there
might be a gap between what is best from society’s point of view and what the landowner
will actually choose. Perhaps the cost-share assistance should be increased in order to
encourage private landowners to invest and therefore better society. Table 5.7 shows the
current cost-share assistance compared with the amount if the cost-share assistance were
based on the carbon benefits. The values in Table 5.7 are the NPVs of only the annual
carbon benefits from pre-commercial thinning.
Table 5.7 Improving Timber Management Results: Comparison of Cost-Share Assistance
based on Carbon Benefits
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Current
WIP CostShare

California
Carbon
Price

Constant
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimate

Increasing
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimate

2.5%

$81.34

$29.25

$146.82

$180.21

3%

$81.34

$27.75

$90.44

$116.52

5%

$81.34

$22.65

$21.94

$28.61

If the cost-share assistance were based on the 2.5% constant social cost of carbon
estimate, the assistance per acre would be $146.82, compared to the current assistance of
only $81.34 per acre. An even higher cost-share assistance would result if it were based
on the increasing social cost of carbon estimates. The actual subsidies of $81.32 per acre
are not as large as the carbon benefits provided to society. Further, the values in Table 5.7
only illustrate what happens when the societal benefits from carbon sequestration are
used to calculate subsidies, when in reality, many more social benefits arise from the
forestry investments.
The 5% discount rate results in Table 5.7 provide an interesting illustration of
private impatience once again. If the cost-share assistance were based on the valuation of
carbon benefits from the private point of view, the subsidies would actually be lower than
they currently are. The internalization of the carbon benefits from a private perspective
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and a social perspective result in very different values. If the cost-share assistance were
based on the avoided damages from society’s perspective (using the 2.5% social cost of
carbon estimate), the issue of private impatience may be fixed.
Overall, in all cases where the landowner participates in WIP, the NPVs are
positive and greater than the comparable NPVs without pre-commercial thinning. This
indicates the success of WIP in incentivizing landowners to invest in a management
practice such as pre-commercial thinning that leads to increased timber benefits to the
landowner and carbon benefits to society. However, basing the cost-share assistance on
the carbon benefits may lead to higher program participation and acceleration towards
Maryland’s GHG reduction goals.
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CHAPTER 6.

CONVERSION FROM AGRICULTURAL LAND TO FOREST:
IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS

6.1

Scenario Overview

The setting for this scenario is a private landowner in Harford County, Maryland
who is considering converting 17 acres of cropland into an oak/hickory forest stand. The
landowner currently collects cropland cash rent for the acreage and is wondering whether
investing in forestry with the goal of harvesting timber in the future would provide a
greater return. Another alternative considered is that the land is of lower quality, for
which the pastureland cash rent is collected instead of cropland cash rent.
Tree stand establishment is one of the eligible practices for EQIP, which is a
federal conservation program that provides cost-share assistance based on the average
costs of eligible practices. Historical data showing EQIP participation from 2009 to 2013
reports that the average number of acres that landowners enrolled for tree establishment
was 17.04 acres (Morgart, 2014).
The base case for this scenario, also referred to as the ‘without’ case, assumes that
the landowner continues to collect cropland or pastureland cash rent for the 17 acres.
Two ‘with’ cases result from this scenario: one assuming the landowner converts to forest
without participating in EQIP and one assuming the landowner converts to forest and
receives cost-share assistance from EQIP for the tree establishment costs.

6.2

Oak/Hickory Growth Function

Oak/hickory mixed forests are the most common forest type in the state of
Maryland (Highfield & Sprague, 2011). These forests contain a mix of many species,
including northern red oak, white oak, chestnut oak, and pignut hickory, and they are
common in the Piedmont region of Maryland (refer back to Figure 3.1).
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The Forest Service conducted a survey of 409 plots of fully stocked, even-aged
oak/hickory stands across a study region extending from Illinois eastward through New
York that included plots in Maryland (Schnur, 1937). Field measurements were obtained
from the plots and yield curves were produced for five different site indices: 40, 50, 60,
70, and 80. A site index is a term used by the Forest Service to indicate the growth
potential for trees at a specific location. It is most commonly reported as the height of the
average dominant and co-dominant tree when the stand is 50 years old. In Harford
County, Maryland the site indices range from 64 to 79, so I used the yield curve for the
site index of 70 for this analysis (Maryland Watershed Services & Maryland Forest
Service, 2003).
The volume per acre in cubic feet was given in five year increments for 100 years
of stand growth. A fitted polynomial equation was used to fill in the annual volume
measures. For the purpose of selling hardwood timber, the volume measures needed to be
converted from cubic feet per acre to MBF per acre to be sold as sawtimber. The
appropriate volume conversion factors are shown in Equation 8 (Nix, 2015).
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 183 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
÷
=
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

(8)

Table 6.1 shows the volume measures used for this analysis, and Figure 6.1 shows
the plotted volume curve for the values in Table 6.1. Since oak/hickory stands are slower
growing, the first volume measure reported is for year 17.
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Table 6.1 Oak/Hickory Volume Measures Used
(MBF/acre)
Year

Volume
Measures

17

1.2

18

1.5

19

1.9

20

2.3

21

2.7

22

3.1

23

3.5

24

3.9

25

4.4

26

4.8

27

5.3

28

5.8

29

6.2

30

6.7

31

7.2

32

7.7

33

8.1

34

8.6

35

9.1

36

9.6

37

10.0

38

10.5

39

11.0

40

11.4

Adapted from Schnur (1937)
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Figure 6.1 Volume Curve for Oak/Hickory Stand (Schnur, 1937)

6.3

Land Conversion and Management Costs

Costs to convert agricultural land to forest include site preparation and planting.
Bair and Alig (2006) reported regional cost estimates, which were also used in the
previous scenario. Maryland is included in the Northeast region, but some of the costs are
not reported for every region individually. In cases where the cost was not reported for
the Northeast region, the Southeast region estimate was used. The Southeast region
extends north up to Virginia, which borders Maryland. The hardwood site preparation
cost to convert cropland to forest for the Southeast region was $81.16 per acre ($114.34
per ace in 2010 dollars). Further, the planting cost for hardwood species in the Southeast
region was $135.42 per acre ($190.79 per acre in 2010 dollars). The establishment costs
are incurred in year zero of the investment time frame.
Management and other costs for this scenario include herbicide treatments,
fertilizer treatments, miscellaneous management costs, and property taxes. Herbicide,
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fertilizer, and miscellaneous management costs were obtained from the Forest Service
publication previously discussed (Bair & Alig, 2006). The herbicide cost per acre for
hardwood species in Southeast region was $58.48 per acre ($82.39 per acre in 2010
dollars). Planted oak seedlings are susceptible to weeds in the first few years after
establishment, so in this scenario, the herbicide treatment costs are incurred in year one of
the investment time frame (Boozer, 2013). The fertilizer cost per acre for hardwood
species in the Southeast was $14.82 ($20.88 per acre in 2010 dollars). Fertilizing an
established oak stand every five years is recommended, so the fertilizer treatment cost is
incurred every five years in this scenario, beginning in year five of the time frame
(Boozer, 2013). The miscellaneous management cost category includes forest
management plans, boundary maintenance, fire protection, and surveying, and it is
estimated on a 10-year basis. For the Southeast region, the miscellaneous management
estimate for hardwood species was $16.71 per acre ($23.54 per acre in 2010 dollars).
This estimate is divided by 10 and included on an annual basis beginning in year one
($2.35 per acre annually).
In the state of Maryland, any forested land that is under a certified forest
management plan is assessed at a land value of $187.50 per acre, which is significantly
less than the average agricultural use assessment value (J. Kays & Schultz, 2002). Since I
am including the miscellaneous management estimate, which includes a cost for
management plans, I assumed that the landowner has a certified forest management plan.
The Harford County property tax rate is 1.042 per $100 in assessed value, and the
Maryland state property tax rate is 0.112 per $100 in assessed value (Maryland
Department of Assessments & Taxation, 2015). With an assessment value of $187.50, the
total county and state property tax per acre is $2.16, which is included annually in the
‘with’ case. In the base case without conversion to forest, the land would be assessed
using the average agricultural assessment value of $312.50 per acre. The total county and
state property tax based on the assessment value of $312.50 per acre for cropland is
$3.61, which is included annually in the ‘without’ case.
A summary of the establishment and management costs and the timing of their
inclusion in the analysis is presented in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 Summary of Costs for Converting Agricultural Land to Forest
Cost

$/Acre
(Real 2010
Dollars)

Inclusion in
‘Without’ Case

Inclusion in ‘With’
Case

Site Preparation

$114.34

-

Year 0

Planting

$190.79

-

Year 0

Herbicide

$82.39

-

Year 1

Fertilizer

$20.88

-

Years 5, 10, 15, 20,
25, 30, 35, 40

Miscellaneous
Management

$2.35

-

Annually Beginning
in Year 1

$2.16

-

Annually Beginning
in Year 0

$3.61

Annually Beginning
in Year 0

-

Forest Property
Tax
Agricultural Land
Property Tax

(Bair & Alig, 2006) and (Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation, 2015)

6.4

Optimal Rotation and Timber Benefits

The maximized MAI in this scenario occurs when the stand is 60 years old, which
is the biologically optimum rotation for the oak/hickory stand. For the analysis, the
economically optimal rotation length, which maximizes the LEV, was used since the
landowner’s objective is to maximize timber profits (refer to Equation 6 in the previous
chapter).
C in Equation 6 is the stand regeneration cost, which is the establishment cost in
this scenario. The site preparation and planting costs discussed in the previous section
were used as the establishment costs in the LEV equation. Again, the hardwood site
preparation cost for the Southeast region was $114.34 per acre, and the planting cost for
hardwood species in the Southeast region was $190.79 per acre (Bair & Alig, 2006). The
total value for C in the LEV calculations was $305.13.
V(t) is the stumpage value when the stand is t years old. Oak is commonly sold as
sawtimber, so I assumed that the harvested timber from this oak/hickory stand is all sold
as such (Szymanski & Pelkki, 2001). Real hardwood sawtimber stumpage prices are not
predicted to increase as dramatically as the softwood pulpwood prices (Haynes, 2003).
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The hardwood sawtimber stumpage price is predicted to increase in real terms from
$387.87 per MBF in 2010 to $439.59 per MBF in 2050 (in 2010 dollars). Again, I will
not include any real price increases in this scenario. I used the 2010 real hardwood
sawtimber stumpage price of $387.87 per MBF to calculate V(t). This equation was also
used to calculate timber benefits from harvesting.
The maximized LEV occurs in year 40, which is the economically optimal rotation
length used for this scenario. This is twenty years sooner than the optimal biologic
rotation length, which is a substantial difference. The slower growing the trees are, the
more spread out the biologic and economic rotations are, which is why there is more of a
difference in rotation lengths in the oak/hickory stand than for the loblolly pine stand
discussed previously.

6.5

Environmental Quality Inventive Program Participation

Tree stand establishment is one of the eligible conservation practices that receives
cost-share assistance from EQIP. The cost-share assistance is based on the average cost to
undergo the agreed upon conservation practices. Every year, the NRCS releases the
eligible practices and payment rates. The 2015 payments rates were used in the
calculation of benefits from EQIP to the landowner in this scenario (Natural Resources
Conservation Service, 2015).
There are several tree establishment practices that have varying costs. For example,
costs for low density hand planting, high density hand planting, and high density
mechanical planting are reported. The hand planting costs are much higher than the
mechanical costs. The high density hand planting cost is $2595.81 per acre, as compared
to the high density mechanical planting cost of $309.43 per acre. Since 17 acres are being
planted with trees, hand planting seems unlikely, and the cost-share assistance is based on
what is actually done. For this reason, I assumed the landowner receives cost-share
assistance based on the cost for high density mechanical planting of $309.43 per acre in
2015 ($297.51 per acre in 2010 dollars) because this is very close to the actual
establishment costs incurred by the landowner of $305.13 per acre as calculated earlier.
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The total EQIP cost-share assistance per acre in the case where the landowner
participates in the program is $297.51.

6.6

Agricultural Land Rent Benefits

The average cropland cash rent for the state of Maryland was used to calculate the
benefits to the landowner in the first ‘without’ case. In 2014, the average cropland cash
rent in Maryland was $94.50 per acre, which is $84.98 per acre in 2010 dollars (National
Agricultural Statistics Service, 2014). In reality, a parcel of lesser quality cropland would
more likely be converted to forest, but the rent values reported are not quality specific. In
the second ‘without’ case, the average pastureland rent for the state of Maryland was
used, which was $43.50 per acre in 2014 ($39.12 in 2010 dollars).

6.7

Carbon Sequestration Benefits

Similar to the previous scenario, the benefits from carbon sequestration were
calculated using a sequence of conversions that result in the metric tons of carbon per
acre that remain permanently sequestered in harvested wood products (shown in Equation
7). The first step was to convert the tree growth from cubic feet per acre to metric tons of
carbon per acre. The next step was to calculate the percentage of the carbon that actually
remains sequestered in the harvested wood products. The process from California Capand-Trade Program’s forest offset protocol was explained earlier. The estimated mill
efficiency for hardwood saw timber is 61.4%. For hardwood sawtimber harvested in the
Northeast region, 3.5% is estimated to remain in in-use wood products after 100 years,
and 28.1% remains in landfills after 100 years. A total of 31.6% of the original carbon
sequestered by the oak/hickory stand remains permanently sequestered, so that is what
was used to calculate the carbon benefits. The annual carbon benefits were calculated the
same way as the previous scenario using both constant and increasing social cost of
carbon estimates and the California carbon price.
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𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
× 2.14 × 19.76 =
× 0.00045359
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
=
× 61.4% × 31.6%
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
(8)
=
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
6.8

Base Case Results

The base case results for the conversion from cropland to forest are shown in Table
6.3 below. Again, the NPVs reported here are before capital gains and income taxes are
subtracted.
Table 6.3 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Base Case NPVs
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Without
Conversion

With
Conversion

With
Conversion & EQIP

2.5%

$2124.08

$1,048.91

$1,346.42

3%

$1962.31

$775.30

$1072.81

5%

$1,477.67

$101.08

$398.59

All of the base case NPVs are positive, but one can tell by looking at Table 6.3 that
the returns from receiving cropland rent are much higher than those from conversion. At
a discount rate of 5%, the returns from converting to forest without cost-share assistance
are only around $100 per acre, which is a significant decrease from the same result at a
2.5% discount rate. Since 5% represents a typical private discount rate, the landowner
would never find it profitable to convert average cropland to forest. As discussed earlier,
5% may actually be a lower bound to an actual private discount rate, which makes it even
less likely that the landowner would ever choose to make the conversion in reality.

6.9

Discount Rate Sensitivity Results

All of the NPVs are positive, but the ‘without’ case has significantly higher returns.
Table 6.4 shows the difference in NPVs between the ‘with’ cases and the ‘without’ case
at all three discount rates.
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Table 6.4 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Additional NPV
from Conversion

Additional NPV from
Conversion & EQIP

2.5%

($1075.17)

($777.66)

3%

($1,187.01)

($889.50)

5%

($1,376.59

($1,079.08)

Converting the cropland in this scenario to forest results in much lower returns than
leaving the land in its original agricultural use. The discount rate definitely makes a
difference in NPVs, but the returns from cropland are higher in all cases. Participation in
EQIP lessens the difference in NPVs between the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases, but the
landowner would still choose to leave the land as cropland. The cropland cash rent would
need to be as low as $9.17 per acre to make the NPV with conversion equal to the NPV
without conversion (using 5% as the discount rate). Similarly, if the landowner
participates in EQIP, the cropland cash rent would have to be $25.56 per acre for the
NPV with conversion to equal the NPV without conversion. The same results using 2.5%
as the discount rate are $43.79 per acre (without EQIP participation) and $55.19 per acre
(with EQIP participation). In reality, a landowner would never convert cropland to forest
unless it was marginal land. As a proxy for the returns from marginal cropland, the
average pastureland cash rent in Maryland in 2010 dollars of $39.12 per acre can be used.
The results using pastureland rent in place of cropland rent are presented next.

6.10 Pastureland Rent Sensitivity Results
Table 6.5 shows the difference in NPVs between converting the land to forest and
keeping it as pastureland.
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Table 6.5 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Additional NPV
from Conversion

Additional NPV from
Conversion & EQIP

2.5%

$122.01

$419.52

3%

($81.01)

$216.50

5%

($534.74)

($246.23)

At a discount rate of 2.5%, the conversion to forest results in a higher NPV than
continuing to collect pastureland rent on the land. However, at a 3% discount rate, the
conversion is only worth it with cost-share assistance from EQIP. Further, at a 5%
discount rate, the conversion results in lower NPVs even with participation in EQIP.
Again, the personal discount rate of the landowner makes a big difference in the
investment decision, and the private impatience is evident in this scenario when looking
at the 5% discount rate results. Even though the conversion would be worth it from
society’s point of view when dealing with pastureland, it would never be worth it from a
private perspective. However, the conversion from pastureland or marginal land to forest
is overall more likely than the conversion from cropland to forest.

6.11 Carbon Price Sensitivity Results
The results below include compensation for carbon that remains permanently
sequestered as a result of investing in the conversion of agricultural land to forest. The
NPVs reported in Table 6.6 and 6.7 are the difference between the NPVs with conversion
and carbon benefits and the base case results without conversion in Table 6.3. Again,
Table 6.6 calculates carbon benefits based on the California carbon price, and Table 6.7
calculates carbon benefits based on both the constant and increasing social cost of carbon
estimates.
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Table 6.6 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including
Carbon Benefits based on California Carbon Price
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Additional NPV
from Conversion &
Carbon Benefits

Additional NPV from
Conversion, EQIP, &
Carbon Benefits

2.5%

($1,027.01)

($729.50)

3%

($1,144.67)

($847.16)

5%

($1,350.79)

($1,053.28)

Table 6.7 Conversion from Cropland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including
Carbon Benefits based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates
($/acre)
Discount
Rate
2.5%
3%
5%

Inclusion of
Social Cost of
Carbon Estimates

Additional NPV from
Conversion & Carbon
Benefits

Additional NPV from
Conversion, EQIP, &
Carbon Benefits

Constant

($833.44)

($535.93)

Increasing

($703.64)

($406.13)

Constant

($1,049.04)

($751.53)

Increasing

($954.40)

($656.89)

Constant

($1,351.59)

($1,054.08)

Increasing

($1,328.07)

($1,030.56)

One can see that even with the inclusion of carbon benefits, the conversion from
cropland to forest would never overcome the opportunity costs. As before, the
interpretation of Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 depends on whether the original goal of EQIP
was to increase carbon sequestration. One of the seven national priorities for EQIP is to
increase biological carbon storage and sequestration, which may indicate that last column
in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 is double counting the carbon benefits. However, even if
double counting is an issue here, the conversion would still never be worth it to the
landowner. Similar to the pre-commercial thinning scenario, at a discount rate of 5%, the
resulting NPV from the inclusion of carbon benefits using the California carbon price are
almost identical to those using the social cost of carbon estimates.
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The same results using pastureland rent instead of cropland rent are shown in Table
6.8 and Table 6.9 below.
Table 6.8 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including
Carbon Benefits from California Carbon Price
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Additional NPV
from Conversion &
Carbon Benefits

Additional NPV from
Conversion, EQIP, &
Carbon Benefits

2.5%

$170.16

$467.67

3%

($38.67)

$258.84

5%

($517.94)

($220.43)

Table 6.9 Conversion from Pastureland to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including
Carbon Benefits from Social Cost of Carbon Estimates
($/acre)
Discount
Rate
2.5%
3%
5%

Inclusion of Social
Cost of Carbon
Estimates

Additional NPV
from Conversion &
Carbon Benefits

Additional NPV from
Conversion, EQIP, &
Carbon Benefits

Constant

$363.74

$661.25

Increasing

$493.54

$791.05

Constant

$56.96

$354.47

Increasing

$151.59

$449.10

Constant

($518.75)

($221.23)

Increasing

($495.22)

($197.71)

The only case where the inclusion of carbon benefits leads to a different investment
decision by the landowner is the case of a 3% discount rate and no participation in EQIP.
For discounts rate of 2.5% and 3%, the inclusion of carbon benefits when the landowner
participates in EQIP increases the returns from conversion significantly, but the
landowner would choose to participate without carbon benefits as well. Assuming 5% is
the most realistic private discount rate, the landowner would likely not choose to convert
to forestry, regardless of whether the land was in crops or pasture. The comparison of
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basing the cost-share assistance on the carbon benefits to society instead of the current
cost-share assistance are shown in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10 Conversion from Agricultural Land to Forest Results: Comparison of CostShare Assistance based on Carbon Benefits
($/acre)

$48.15

Constant
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimate
$241.73

Increasing
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimate
$371.53

$297.51

$42.34

$137.97

$232.61

$297.51

$25.80

$25.00

$81.66

Discount
Rate

Current
WIP CostShare

California
Carbon
Price

2.5%

$297.51

3%
5%

When the cost-share assistance is based on the 2.5% increasing social cost of
carbon estimate, the cost-share would be larger than it currently is. However, in all other
cases, even when the cost-share assistance is based on the constant 2.5% social cost of
carbon estimate, the cost-share is actually higher in its current state. This suggests that the
cost-share assistance is close to the value of carbon benefits already. In this scenario,
basing the cost-share assistance on the societal benefits may not induce any greater
participation. Overall, the program may be more successful by targeting pastureland or
marginal cropland because the difference in NPVs are positive in some cases when
pastureland rent is used and always negative when average cropland rent is used.
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CHAPTER 7.

CONVERSION FROM LAWN TO FOREST: IMPLEMENTATION
AND RESULTS

7.1

Scenario Overview

The setting for this scenario is a private homeowner in Montgomery County,
Maryland who is considering converting one acre of lawn into a red oak forest stand. This
scenario provides insights on homeowners’ preferences for lawn versus forest. The new
L2W Initiative in Maryland covers all of the costs to establish trees on any patches of
lawn that are at least one acre in size. All of the seedling and equipment purchases and
planting are done by the Maryland DNR and the Arbor Day Foundation, so the
landowner never has to incur any establishment costs. The program was launched in four
pilot counties in 2014, including Montgomery County. The four species planted in 2014
as part of this program were red oak, red bud, hazelnut, and persimmon (Feldt, 2014).
For simplicity, the same volume measures used in the conversion from cropland
scenario for an oak/hickory stand are used here. 79.7% of the 409 fully stocked, evenaged oak/hickory plots surveyed by the Forest Service included red oak (Schnur, 1937). I
assumed that the annual volume measures for the red oak stand established in this
scenario would be the same as the oak/hickory stand established in the previous scenario.
The economically optimal rotation length was calculated in the previous chapter as 40
years, which is used here as well.
The base case for this scenario, also referred to as the ‘without’ case, assumes that
the homeowner leaves the one acre as lawn. Two ‘with’ cases result from this scenario:
one assuming the homeowner converts the lawn to forest without participating in L2W
and one assuming the homeowner converts the lawn to forest and receives cost-share
assistance from L2W for the tree establishment costs. The results for the two ‘with’ cases
are calculated both with and without timber harvest. The homeowner would likely not
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harvest timber from one acre of trees, but calculating the revenue from timber harvest
represents the maximum potential private benefits of establishing forest.

7.2

Establishment and Management Costs

The establishment costs used for this scenario are mostly the same as those used in
the establishment of the oak/hickory stand in the previous scenario. The only difference is
that the hardwood site preparation cost to convert pastureland to forest for the Southeast
region was used in place of the cost to convert cropland to forest. The cost per acre to
convert pastureland to forest in the Southeast region was $103.01 per acre ($145.13 per
ace in 2010 dollars). The planting, herbicide, fertilizer, and miscellaneous management
costs are identical to the previous scenario: $190.79 per acre, $82.39 per acre $20.88 per
acre, and $2.35 per acre respectively (Bair & Alig, 2006).
The property taxes on lawn space would be based on the assessed value of the
home in reality, but it is difficult to calculate an average assessed value for a home. For
simplicity, I assumed the one acre of land was assessed as average agricultural land in the
‘without’ case and forested land under a certified management plan in the ‘with’ cases.
The Montgomery County property tax rate is 0.732 per $100 in assessed value, and the
Maryland state property tax rate is 0.112 per $100 in assessed value (Maryland
Department of Assessments and Taxation 2015). With an assessment value of $187.50
for forested land, the total county and state property tax per acre is $1.58, which is
included annually in the ‘with’ case. The total county and state property tax based on the
average agricultural land assessment value of $312.50 per acre for cropland is $2.64,
which is included annually in the ‘without’ case.
Zhou, Troy, Morgan Grove, and Jenkins (2009) conducted an econometric study to
predict lawn-care expenditures based on demographic and socioeconomic indicators. In
the process, they collected lawn care expenditures for Baltimore city and Baltimore
County, Maryland. The average annual total lawn care expenditures were $319.71 in
2003 ($427.59 in 2010 dollars). The total lawn care expenditures included spending on
lawn care services, lawn care supplies, equipment repair and rentals, and purchases of
new yard machinery. The average lawn size used to produce these cost estimates is not
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reported, so this is a rough estimate to include for this scenario. One acre of lawn seems
to be on the larger end of lawn size, so in reality, the expenditures may be more than
these. However, I assumed that the annual lawn care maintenance cost is $427.59 per
acre.
A summary of the establishment and management costs and the timing of their
inclusion in the analysis is presented in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Summary of Costs for Converting Lawn to Forest
Cost

$/Acre
(Real 2010
Dollars)

Inclusion in
‘Without’ Case

Inclusion in ‘With’
Case

Site Preparation

$145.13

-

Year 0

Planting

$190.79

-

Year 0

Herbicide

$82.39

-

Year 1

Fertilizer

$20.88

-

Years 5, 10, 15, 20,
25, 30, 35, 40

Miscellaneous
Management

$2.35

-

Annually Beginning
in Year 1

Forest Property
Tax

$1.58

-

Annually Beginning
in Year 0

Cropland Property
Tax

$2.64

Annually Beginning
in Year 0

-

Lawn Care Costs

$427.59

Annually Beginning
in Year 0

-

(Bair and Alig 2006) (Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation, 2015) and
(Zhou et al. 2009)
7.3

Lawn to Woodland Participation

As previously discussed, the L2W Initiative covers 100% of the establishment
costs. In the case where the homeowner participates in L2W, the site preparation and
planting costs are zero. In other words, the total cost-share assistance per acre is $335.91.
The landowner is still responsible for the management costs with participation in L2W.
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7.4

Carbon Sequestration Benefits

The calculation of the carbon that remains permanently sequestered in harvested
wood products for this scenario follows the same steps as the conversion from cropland
to forest scenario. The process used to include carbon benefits in the ‘with’ cases that
account for timber harvest is identical to the process used in the previous chapter.
However, the ‘with’ cases in this scenario are also calculated without a timber harvest.
Without harvesting any timber, the carbon that remains permanently sequestered as a
result of the conversion to forest is much higher since none of it is released by harvesting.
To calculate the carbon benefits in the ‘with’ cases that do not account for timber harvest,
the total metric tons of annual carbon sequestration per acre (refer to equation 8 in the
previous chapter) were multiplied by the appropriate carbon values. This calculation was
done every year until the same year as the economically optimal rotation (year 40) to
make the NPVs with and without timber harvest comparable.

7.5

Base Case Results

The net revenue each year was calculated by subtracting the annual costs from the
annual benefits. In the ‘without’ case where the homeowner decides to keep the lawn as
is, the net revenues in every year are negative since the aesthetic benefits from owning
lawn are not monetized. Similar to the ‘without’ case, the ‘with’ cases that do not account
for timber harvest have negative net revenues every year before the inclusion of carbon
benefits. The base case NPVs are shown in Table 7.2. Lawn to Woodland is abbreviated
as L2W in the result tables.
Table 7.2 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Base Case NPVs
($/acre)
Without Timber Harvest
Discount
Rate

Without
Conversion

With
Conversion

2.5%

($11,230.18)

($616.41)

With
Conversion
& L2W
($280.50)

3%

($10,374.88)

($599.38)

5%

($7,812.57)

($548.35)

With Timber Harvest

$1,033.31

With
Conversion
& L2W
$1,369.22

($263.47)

$758.54

$1,094.45

($212.44)

$80.86

$416.77

With
Conversion
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The base case results show how much more costly lawn is to maintain than forest.
Conversion to forest also comes with costs, but they are much lower than the lawn
maintenance costs. In reality, forest management costs would likely be higher than what
is included in this scenario, but they would likely still be less than the lawn maintenance
costs. Even without harvesting timber, converting to forest has a higher NPV than
keeping it in lawn. Without participating in L2W, the homeowner still has enough
incentive to invest in forestry if they plan on harvesting timber. Overall, on such a small
piece of land as one acre, the investment decision likely depends more on the aesthetic
values of lawn versus forest that the homeowner possesses. Large lawn space provides
numerous benefits such as space for outdoor games and gatherings which cannot be
estimated. In order for the landowner to decide not to convert to forest, their aesthetic
value of lawn must be high enough to account for the large difference in NPVs between
the ‘with’ and ‘without’ cases. Preference for lawn might limit participation in L2W and
likely varies between landowners.

7.6

Discount Rate Sensitivity Results

The results in Table 7.3 show the difference in NPVs between the ‘with’ cases and
the case without conversion to forest.
Table 7.3 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs
($/acre)
Without Timber Harvest

With Timber Harvest

Discount
Rate

Additional NPV
from Conversion

Additional NPV
from Conversion
& L2W

Additional
NPV from
Conversion

Additional NPV
from Conversion
& L2W

2.5%

$10,613.77

$10,949.68

$12,263.49

$12,599.40

3%

$9,775.50

$10,111.41

$11,133.42

$11,469.33

5%

$7,264.22

$7,600.14

$7,893.43

$8,229.34

In all cases, the homeowner could earn more by converting the lawn to forest.
These results highlight how costly lawn maintenance is compared to forest maintenance.
Again, even if the maintenance costs of the conversion to forest ended up being higher
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than the ones included in this analysis, they would likely never be high enough to be
more expensive than the lawn maintenance costs. This is especially true since the lawn
maintenance cost included here is likely an underestimate as well. The values in Table
7.3 can be thought of as the aesthetic value of lawn that the landowner would need in
order to choose not to invest in forestry.

7.7

Carbon Price Sensitivity Results

The NPVs reported in Table 7.4 (using the California carbon price) and Table 7.5
(using the constant and increasing social cost of carbon estimates) are the difference
between the NPVs with carbon benefits and the ones in Table 7.2 without conversion to
forest. The issue of double counting may be present again here when both the cost-share
assistance from L2W and the carbon benefits are included. The program information cites
cleaner water, cleaner air, cooler temperatures, and wildlife diversity as reasons why one
should participate in the program (Maryland Forest Service, 2014). Since carbon
sequestration is a component of the cleaner air benefit, the subsidies may already be
accounting for the carbon benefits. However, the NPVs with conversion to forest were
already substantially higher than the ‘without’ case, so the possible double counting does
not impact the investment decision.
Table 7.4 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including
Carbon Benefits based on California Carbon Price
($/acre)
Without Timber Harvest
Additional NPV
Discount from Conversion
Rate
& Carbon
Benefits

With Timber Harvest

Additional NPV
from Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits

Additional NPV
from Conversion
& Carbon
Benefits

Additional NPV
from Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits

2.5%

$10,861.95

$11,197.86

$12,311.64

$12,647.55

3%

$9,993.72

$10,329.63

$11,175.76

$11,511.67

5%

$7,397.22

$7,733.13

$7,919.23

$8,255.14
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Table 7.5 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Difference in NPVs Including
Carbon Benefits based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates
($/acre)
Without Timber Harvest

Discount
Rate

2.5%
3%
5%

With Timber Harvest

Inclusion
of Social
Cost of
Carbon
Estimates

Additional
NPV from
Conversion &
Carbon
Benefits

Additional NPV
from
Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits

Additional
NPV from
Conversion &
Carbon
Benefits

Additional NPV
from
Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits

Constant

$11,859.65

$12,195.56

$12,505.22

$12,841.13

Increasing

$12,528.64

$12,864.55

$12,635.02

$12,970.93

Constant

$10,486,60

$10,822.52

$11,271.39

$11,607.30

Increasing

$10,974.35

$11,310.26

$11,366.03

$11,701.94

Constant

$7,393.07

$7,728.98

$7,918.43

$8,254.34

Increasing

$7,514.32

$7,850.23

$7,941.95

$8,277.86

Since the NPVs with conversion were already so much higher than without
conversion in all cases, it is difficult to tell how much difference the carbon benefits
make by looking at Table 7.4 and Table 7.5. In this case, it makes sense to show the
actual NPVs including carbon benefits, without comparing them to the NPV without
conversion.
Table 7.6 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: NPVs Including Carbon Benefits
based on California Carbon Price
($/acre)
Without Timber Harvest

With Timber Harvest

Discount
Rate

With Conversion
& Carbon
Benefits

With Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits

With Conversion
& Carbon
Benefits

With Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits

2.5%

($368.23)

($32.32)

$1,081.46

$1,417.37

3%

($381.16)

($45.25)

$800.88

$1,136.79

5%

($415.35)

($79.44)

$106.66

$442.57
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Table 7.7 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: NPVs Including Carbon Benefits
based on Social Cost of Carbon Estimates
($/acre)
Without Timber Harvest
Discount
Rate

2.5%
3%
5%

With Timber Harvest

Inclusion of
Social Cost
of Carbon
Estimates
Constant

With
Conversion
& Carbon
Benefits
$629.47

With
Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits
$956.38

With
Conversion
& Carbon
Benefits
$1,275.03

With
Conversion,
L2W, & Carbon
Benefits
$1,610.95

Increasing

$1,298.46

$1,634.37

$1,404.84

$1,740.75

Constant

$111.72

$447.63

$896.51

$1,232.42

Increasing

$599.47

$935.38

$991.14

$1,327.05

Constant

($419.50)

($83.59)

$105.86

$441.77

Increasing

($298.25)

$37.66

$129.38

$465.29

When the carbon benefits are based on the 2.5% and 3% social cost of carbon
estimates, the conversion from lawn to forest results in a positive NPV, even without cost
share from L2W. At a discount rate of 5% and including the carbon benefits based on the
increasing social cost of carbon estimates, the conversion also results in a positive NPV
without timber harvest. However, it is only when both the current L2W cost-share
assistance and the carbon benefits are included, which may be double counting.
Table 7.8 shows the cost-share assistance based on the discounted carbon benefits
provided by the conversion when no timber is harvested. Table 7.9 shows the cost-share
assistance based on the carbon benefits and timber harvest.
Table 7.8 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-Share
Assistance based on Carbon Benefits without Timber Harvest
($/acre)

$248.18

Constant
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimate
$1,245.87

Increasing
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimates
$1,914.87

$335.91

$218.22

$711.10

$1,198.85

$335.91

$133.00

$128.85

$250.10

Discount
Rate

Current
WIP CostShare

California
Carbon
Price

2.5%

$335.91

3%
5%
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Table 7.9 Conversion from Lawn to Forest Results: Comparison of Cost-Share
Assistance based on Carbon Benefits with Timber Harvest
($/acre)
Discount
Rate

Current
WIP CostShare

California
Carbon
Price

Constant
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimate

Increasing
Social Cost of
Carbon
Estimates

2.5%

$335.91

$48.15

$241.73

$371.53

3%

$335.91

$42.34

$137.97

$232.61

5%

$335.91

$25.80

$25.00

$48.52

Cost-share assistance based on the 2.5% and 3% social cost of carbon estimates
would be substantially higher than the current cost-share assistance. From society’s
perspective the conversion is very valuable, but again, the private impatience at a
discount rate of 5% might stop the private landowner from investing. The current costshare assistance at a 5% discount rate is already higher than the carbon benefits from a
private perspective. Again, the question of whether the government should make up the
difference by offering larger subsidies in order to increase program participation and
better society as a whole arises. Since the investment decision in this scenario depends
largely on the aesthetic values of the landowner, larger subsidies could help outweigh a
potentially high aesthetic value of lawn.
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CHAPTER 8.

8.1

CONCLUSION

Overview of Conclusions

For each scenario, conclusions can be made by comparing the results of the CBA
with the observed forestry cost-share program participation and the GIS analysis results.
Further, the results can provide insights on how realistic the goals set forth by Maryland’s
GHGRP are in regards to the forestry efforts. Figure 8.1 shows how the analysis results
feed into the big picture of what is really happening in Maryland.
Use private CBA results to
estimate the individual’s economic
return or loss from participating in
a forestry cost-share program

Use social CBA results to compare
current cost-share assistance to the
social carbon benefits that result
from the forestry investments

Compare CBA results to actual
program participation

Compare actual participation with
the program scope according to
GIS analysis results

Compare program scope with
goals set forth by the GHGRP
Figure 8.1 Progression of Results
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A discussion of how the results for each scenario fit together using the flow
diagram in Figure 8.1 will be presented in the next three sections.

8.2

Improving Timber Management: Synthesis of Results

The results of the CBA on improving timber management provide some insights on
the observed WIP participation and the scope of land that is eligible for WIP. The timber
management improvement in question was pre-commercial thinning of a four-year-old
loblolly pine stand. With a pre-commercial thinning cost of $125.14 per acre, the
resulting NPVs are positive in every case except the case with a discount rate of 5% and
no participation in WIP. Since 5% is likely a representation of a private discount rate, this
is an indicator that WIP should be successful in inducing improved timber management
that would not have happened in the absence of the program. Even after adjusting for the
uncertainty in pre-commercial thinning costs, the NPVs were positive with participation
in WIP for all discount rates. Cost-share assistance from WIP is enough to result in a
positive NPV from pre-commercial thinning, even at a discount rate of 5%. From these
results, one could predict that forest owners would be willing to participate in WIP.
The average number of acres annually enrolled in WIP, based on data from the past
eight years, is 3,055 (Rider, 2014). This is actually above the projected goal set forth as
part of the original program information of enrolling 1,500 to 2,000 acres annually
(Forest Service, 2008). According to the GIS analysis conducted, there are 736,761 acres
of land that meet the eligibility requirements for WIP. Participation in WIP has exceeded
the original program scope, but the number of eligible acres in Maryland greatly exceeds
the observed enrollment.
Perhaps landowners are improving timber management without the help of costshare programs or they are not specifically managing their forests for maximized timber
growth. Landowners can pay DNR or other private forest industry firms to assist in
developing forest stewardship plans, examining planting sites, marking areas in need of
timber stand improvement, and renting forestry equipment. The extent of participation in
such services was not gathered as part of this research, so no conclusion can be made on
the number of acres of forest land in Maryland that is managed intensively. However, for

84
landowners interested in improving timber management, WIP definitely provides the
right incentives to induce participation.
The permanently sequestered carbon is greater with pre-commercial thinning due to
accelerated growth following the thinning. WIP is cited as one of the programs in the
Maryland GHGRP that will help the state meet the 2020 GHG reduction target of 25%
below 2006 levels by increasing carbon sequestration by forests (Department of the
Environment, 2013). The CBA results definitely support the claim that pre-commercial
thinning leads to greater carbon sequestration than in similar stands without thinning.
According to the GIS analysis, the lifetime carbon sequestration potential of the land that
is eligible for WIP is about 139 million tons of carbon, which is 188 tons of carbon per
acre. This is far above the estimated 4.56 million tons of carbon emissions reductions
from forestry efforts in the GHGRP. However, those two numbers cannot really be
compared because the estimate from the GHGRP only accounts for reductions between
2012 and 2020, while the carbon sequestration potential is over the entire plant lifetime.
If anything, the GIS results provide evidence that the GHGRP estimate of carbon
reductions due to forestry is reachable through increased participation in WIP.
When the cost-share assistance is based on the carbon benefits provided to society
by the investment in pre-commercial thinning, the decision of whether or not to
participate in WIP does not change. However, it does increase the returns for the
landowner, which could increase program participation if that benefit accrued to the
landowner. Cost-share assistance based on the constant 2.5% social cost of carbon
estimate would be $146.82 per acre, compared to the current cost-share assistance of
$81.34 per acre. Subsidizing carbon sequestration that results from WIP participation
would potentially accelerate Maryland’s progress towards the goals laid out by the
GHGRP.

8.3

Conversion from Agricultural Land to Forest: Synthesis of Results

The CBA results of the decision to convert cropland to forest are largely in favor of
leaving the land as cropland. EQIP, administered by the NRCS, provides cost-share
assistance for a large number of conservation practices, including several forestry
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practices. The conservation practice in question here was establishing new trees on
cropland. Even with participation in EQIP, the NPVs from conversion to forest are
around $1,000 per acre less than those of collecting cropland rent at all three discount
rates (2.5%, 3%, and 5%). Based on these results, one would estimate that participation in
EQIP for tree establishment would be relatively low.
From 2009 to 2013, tree establishment through EQIP has only been implemented
on 344 acres in Maryland, which is as expected based on the CBA results (Morgart,
2014). According to the national land cover data that was used for the GIS analyses, there
are around 1.2 million acres of cultivated cropland in Maryland (Jin et al., 2013). 344
acres is miniscule compared to the total eligible land for EQIP. In reality, lower value
cropland would be much more likely enrolled in EQIP, but the cropland rent used here
was an average value. The cropland would have to be worth around 40% less than the
average cash rent of approximately $85 per acre (2010 dollars) for the landowner to
establish trees as part of EQIP and not lose money. Perhaps EQIP would be more
successful if it targeted marginal lands.
As a proxy for marginal cropland, the average pastureland rent of $39.12 per acre
was used instead of the cropland rent. There are around 747,000 acres of pastureland in
Maryland that could potentially be converted to forest. The NPVs with conversion of
pastureland and EQIP participation were higher for discount rates of 2.5% and 3% than
those without conversion. However, at a 5% discount rate, the conversion still results in
lower NPVs even with participation in EQIP. Again, the personal discount rate of the
landowner makes a big difference in the investment decision. However, the conversion
from pastureland to forest is definitely more likely than the conversion from cropland to
forest.
EQIP is also cited as one of the programs in the Maryland GHGRP that will help
the state meet the 2020 GHG reduction target by increasing carbon sequestration in
forests. When carbon benefits are included in the CBA, the NPVs from conversion to
forest are still significantly lower than those of leaving the land as is. Even in the case of
using pastureland rent, at a 5% discount rate, the inclusion of carbon benefits still does
not outweigh the NPV without conversion. This indicates that from society’s view, at a
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2.5% discount rate, the pastureland should be converted to forest, but the private
landowner will likely not make the investment. There may be potential for greater EQIP
participation if the subsidies were increased to make the conversion from pastureland to
forest a worthwhile investment at a 5% discount rate. Overall, larger subsidies are needed
to induce landowners to convert any agricultural land to forest. Perhaps targeting land
that is not committed to agriculture is a better option, which is discussed in the next
section.

8.4

Conversion from Lawn to Forest: Synthesis of Results

According to the CBA results, targeting lawn for conversion to forest should yield
much better results than targeting cropland. In all cases, the NPVs from converting to
forest are greater than those from caring for lawn, even without harvesting any timber or
participating in L2W. This is due to the large annual lawn maintenance costs. The
aesthetic values that the landowner possesses for lawn versus forest become the
determining factor for participation in a program like L2W because neither land use
results in large returns to the landowner.
According to the GIS analysis results, there are 230,450 acres of eligible land for
L2W, which is much lower than the one million acre estimate set forth as part of the
program announcement (Forest Service, 2014a). Since the program is new, there is only
one year of participation data to compare this to. In 2014, around 15 acres were enrolled
in the program, which seems very small even though the program is new. The seemingly
slow start to the program could be for a number of reasons. For example, it could be a
program budget constraint, limited program administration resources, poor
advertisement, or simply because private landowners do not want to convert their lawn to
forest.
The GIS analysis results estimate that the total lifetime sequestration potential of
the eligible land is about 300 million tons of carbon, which is approximately 1,300 tons
per acre. This is significantly higher than the carbon sequestration potential per acre on
the WIP land of 188 tons. This makes sense since the carbon sequestration potential only
accounts for additional sequestration beyond what is already there. The land eligible for
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WIP is already forested, so the potential for further sequestration is lower than that of
land that has not been forested yet.
The inclusion of carbon benefits in this scenario is enough to outweigh the initial
negative NPVs from conversion to forest without harvesting timber when the carbon
benefits are calculated using the 2.5% and 3% social cost of carbon estimates. However,
for a discount rate of 5%, which is likely more similar to a private discount rate, the
carbon benefits do not outweigh the negative NPV of investing in forestry without
harvesting timber, which illustrates the concept of private impatience. When the costshare assistance is based on the constant 2.5% social cost of carbon estimate, it is
$1245.87 per acre, compared to the current cost-share assistance of $335.91 per acre.
Since the conversion is so valuable from society’s perspective, increasing the cost-share
assistance to fully internalize the positive external social benefits could increase program
participation. Overall, from the three scenarios, it appears like increasing investment in
the L2W program would make the greatest impact on reducing atmospheric carbon.

8.5

Comparison of Carbon Sequestration Potential and Abatement Costs

This section presents a discussion of the carbon sequestration potential of the
forestry programs in Maryland and a comparison of the effective marginal abatement
costs of forestry investments that qualify for each program. From Maryland’s GHGRP,
the forestry and sequestration efforts between 2012 and 2020 were projected to result in a
reduction in emissions of 4.56 million metric tons. The GIS analysis results estimated the
lifetime carbon sequestration potential of all eligible land for each program, which was
divided into a per acre estimate. This per acre estimate was multiplied by the actual
program participation over the past few years to estimate how much carbon will be
sequestered over the lifetime of the land that is already enrolled in each program. Further,
in the case of L2W, the program implementation materials estimated how much land was
eligible for the program, so the per acre lifetime carbon sequestration potential estimate
was also multiplied by the program potential according to DNR. Table 8.1 shows how
these carbon sequestration estimates compare.
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Table 8.1 Carbon Sequestration Potential of Maryland’s Forestry Programs
(millions of tons of carbon)
Program Participation
Actual
Realized
Potential

GIS Estimated
Potential

DNR/GHGRP
Estimated
Potential

WIP

4.61

138.82

N/A

EQIP
Conversion of Cropland
Conversion of Pastureland

0.45

1570.30
977.39

N/A

L2W

0.02

301.56

1308.89

Total Forestry Efforts

5.08

2988.07

4.56

One can see from Table 8.1 that the total lifetime carbon sequestration potential is
not even close to being realized for any of the programs. Further, the DNR estimated
carbon sequestration potential of L2W is much higher than the GIS analysis results.
However, the GIS estimated lifetime carbon sequestration potentials for the three
programs are still quite substantial. For perspective, the total 2013 Maryland GHG
emissions was 96.8 million tons, so the total GIS estimated lifetime carbon sequestration
potential for all three programs is the equivalent of about 30 years of annual emissions.
Even though the lifetime potentials are far from being realized, the goal set forth by the
2012 GHGRP for the total forestry and sequestration efforts to result in a reduction of
4.56 million tons by 2020 appears to be doable. The total lifetime carbon sequestration
potential for the land already enrolled in the programs is 5.08 million tons. Increasing
participation in the forestry cost-share programs is definitely a climate change mitigation
strategy that could be successful.
The important question is how the abatement costs from the forestry cost-share
program participants compare to abatement costs from carbon markets. Table 8.2
compares the abatement costs of each forestry investment to the abatement costs from
United States carbon markets (California and RGGI) and the marginal damages as
estimated by the constant and increasing social cost of carbon estimates. The effective
abatement costs were calculated by dividing the ‘with’ minus ‘without’ NPVs (in dollars
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per acre) for each scenario by the total permanently sequestered carbon (in tons per acre)
that results from the forestry investment. The L2W abatement costs were also calculated
using just the ‘with’ NPVs to provide a perspective of what happens when the lawn
maintenance costs are not included as opportunity costs in the calculation. The timing of
the carbon sequestration is not taken into account in these calculations.
Table 8.2 Effective Abatement Costs of Forestry Investments
(2010 $/ton)
Discount Rate
2.5%

3%

5%

WIP - Pre-Commercial Thinning

($12.67)

($6.56)

$15.02

EQIP - Agricultural Land Conversion
Conversion of Cropland
Conversion of Pastureland

$138.24
($15.69)

$152.62
$10.42

$176.99
$69.91

L2W - Lawn Conversion
With Timber Harvest
Without Timber Harvest
Excluding Lawn Maintenance Costs
With Timber Harvest
Without Timber Harvest

($1,576.76) ($1,431.47) ($1,014.89)
($102.70)
($94.59)
($70.29)
($132.86)
$5.96

($97.53)
$5.80

($10.40)
$5.31

Marginal Abatement Costs – Carbon Markets
California Cap-and-Trade Program
RGGI

$12.14
$4.94

$12.14
$4.94

$12.14
$4.94

Marginal Damage - Social Cost of Carbon
Constant
Rising

$54.54
$60.96

$34.22
$39.57

$11.76
$11.76

In many cases, the abatement costs for forestry investments are negative, which
means that those investments are profitable for private landowners at a given discount
rate. Hence, the existing incentives are enough for the landowner to be willing to make
the forestry investment, even without extra incentives to sequester carbon. The lawn
conversion scenarios result in very large negative numbers, which means that the
potential private benefits are quite substantial from the conversion. Even when the
opportunity costs of lawn maintenance are excluded from the calculations, the abatement
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costs are still very low. Large positive abatement costs indicate investments that are not
privately profitable and therefore are not cost-effective mitigation strategies. The only
cases where the abatement costs of forestry investments are higher than the California
carbon price are the conversion from agricultural land cases. The only exceptions are the
conversion from pastureland to forest at the 2.5% and 3% discount rates. Since the
cropland cash rent is higher than the pastureland cash rent, the abatement costs are higher
for cropland conversion than for pastureland conversion.
Table 8.3 shows what the carbon price (California or RGGI) would need to be for
the private landowner to make the forestry investment in question and gain the monetized
external benefits from the permanently sequestered carbon that results from the
investment. In other words, Table 8.3 shows the break-even carbon prices of the three
forestry investment scenarios. The break-even carbon prices were calculated by
determining which carbon price sets the ‘with’ minus ‘without’ NPVs equal to zero for
each forestry investment. The ‘with’ minus ‘without’ NPVs used for the calculations
were those that include carbon benefits based on the California carbon price. The timing
of the carbon sequestration is taken into account in Table 8.3, which is different from
Table 8.2. The carbon sequestered further in the future is discounted back to the
beginning of the investment, so it is not as valuable.
Table 8.3 Break-Even Carbon Prices of Forestry Investments
(2010 $/ton)
Discount Rate
2.5%

3%

5%

WIP - Pre-Commercial Thinning

($23.55)

($12.80)

$35.64

EQIP - Agricultural Land Conversion
Conversion of Cropland
Conversion of Pastureland

$271.14
($30.77)

$340.44
$23.23

$647.81
$255.88

L2W - Lawn Conversion
With Timber Harvest
Without Timber Harvest
Excluding Lawn Maintenance Costs
With Timber Harvest
Without Timber Harvest

($3,092.67) ($3,193.13) ($3,714.57)
($519.33)
($543.98)
($663.27)
($260.58)
$30.16

($217.55)
$33.35

($38.05)
$50.07
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A positive break-even carbon price indicates that the current carbon price would
have to increase to that level in order for the landowner to make the forestry investment.
For example, in the case of conversion from cropland to forest at a typical private
discount rate of 5%, the carbon price would need to increase to $647.81 per ton before
the landowner would make the conversion and gain the monetized carbon benefits.
Again, this illustrates how difficult it is to induce conversion of cropland to forest. In the
case of conversion from pastureland to forest, the break-even carbon prices are much
smaller. However, at a discount rate of 5%, the break-even carbon price for conversion
from pastureland is $255.88, which is still quite large.
There are many cases where the break-even California carbon price is substantially
lower than the current California price of around $12 per ton. The main example of this is
the lawn to forest scenarios, especially when the landowner harvests timber. However,
even the cases without timber harvest result in large negative break-even carbon prices. A
negative break-even carbon price indicates that the forestry investment is not contingent
on participation in the carbon market. The investment is privately profitable without any
monetized external carbon benefits. Since it is so cheap to sequester carbon by converting
lawn to forest, pursuing this as a mitigation strategy makes sense for the state of
Maryland. Further, pre-commercial thinning is relatively cheap as well, especially at the
2.5% and 3% discount rates. These results suggest that increasing participation in the two
state-funded programs (WIP and L2W) would be a cost-effective climate change
mitigation strategy for Maryland.

8.6

Analysis Limitations

The analysis limitations are largely due to data imperfections and the need to
condense the actual heterogeneity amongst land and forest stands in Maryland into three
average case scenarios. The scenarios were region specific to Maryland, but not all of the
data were region specific. For example, most of the costs taken from Bair and Alig’s
(2006) regional cost publications were not reported for the Northeast region, so the costs
for the Southeast region were used. Also, the volume growth measures for loblolly pine
were not specific to a certain region. The growth rate could vary significantly based on
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locational features. Even within the Northeast region, costs may vary significantly
between states, which is not accounted for in much of the data used. Further, while the
lawn care maintenance cost was specific to Maryland, the estimate did not account for
lawn size, so some uncertainty surrounds the NPVs from the base case in the L2W
scenario. If anything, the lawn maintenance costs were likely lower than they would be in
reality, since one acre of lawn is quite large. Also, the projected prices from Haynes
(2003) are outdated even though they seemed like the best available estimates to use.
Uncertainty in the discount rate is another limitation that is common for most
analyses of this type. Every landowner has a unique discount rate depending on their
preferences for future consumption and risk, so assuming that every landowners’ discount
rate will fall into one of the discount rates I used is a limitation. I assumed that 2.5% was
a representation of the social discount rate, and 5% represented a private discount rate.
However, private landowners could just as easily have discount rates much higher than
5% in reality, which would make the forestry investments even less likely in all scenarios
and further accelerate the problem of private impatience. This may explain the low
program participation observed over the past few years.
The uncertainty in carbon valuation that was discussed in the review of climate
change economics section also exposes a limitation of this analysis. Uncertainty in future
damages from carbon emissions as predicted by the IAMs used to estimate the social cost
of carbon result in estimates ranging from around $12 a ton to $60 a ton for 2010
(Greenstone et al., 2013). It has been argued by some that these values vastly
underestimate the true damages from carbon emissions (Moore & Diaz, 2015). Further,
the majority of carbon prices emerging from markets around the globe are on the low end
of the social cost of carbon estimates. By using both the social cost of carbon estimates
and the California carbon prices, some of the uncertainty was accounted for through
sensitivity analysis.
Lastly, the inclusion of only the carbon sequestration benefits excludes many other
important co-benefits from forestry. For example, water quality improvements, wildlife
habitats, and recreational opportunities could have been included in a social cost benefit
analysis as well. Since only the benefits from carbon sequestration were included in this
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analysis, the numbers resulting from the social CBA are only a lower bound of the actual
benefits that forests provide to society. Further, the social benefits discussed here are
global benefits, not just benefits for the state of Maryland. Regional programs are used in
this analysis, and in reality, Maryland only realizes a portion of the benefits provided to
society by the programs. To really deal with climate change problems, other states need
to be doing what Maryland is doing. To suggest that Maryland needs to invest more in its
forestry programs is one small piece of what needs to be done to solve the climate change
problem.

8.7

Future Research and Recommendations

I plan to present the results of this analysis to employees of the Maryland DNR
with hopes of providing a private landowner perspective on whether the forestry costshare programs provide the right incentives to induce participation. I would like to
provide guidance to the Maryland DNR on what to emphasize in pushing the programs
forward. Further, since this research illustrates a potential use of GIS data produced by
Dubayah et al. (2013) as part of NASA’s CMS program, I hope to increase awareness of
the value of such data. The GIS analysis provided considerable insights on the actual
participation relative to the program scope and on the carbon sequestration potential. By
illustrating the value of carbon monitoring data, the data is more likely to be updated in
the future.
One of the main conclusions from this analysis is that even when the forestry costshare programs provide enough incentive to induce participation, the actual participation
is much less than the potential. Even in cases where the program seems to be providing
enough incentive for landowners to participate, the uptake of the program seems slow.
Perhaps there is a budget constraint or limited administrative resources for the program,
which both could limit participation. One recommendation for the DNR in Maryland is to
increase advertisement of their forestry cost-share programs. The new L2W program is
difficult to find on the DNR website, and the WIP advertisement materials do not seem
like they have been updated since the program was first implemented.
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In addition to increasing program advertisement, if the cost-share assistance was
adjusted to include greater compensation for carbon sequestration, program participation
may be increased. The difference in investment decisions using the 2.5% discount rate
and 5% discount rate illustrates the idea of private impatience in all scenarios. If the costshare assistance fully internalized the external carbon sequestration benefits provided to
society by the forestry investments, the problem of private impatience may decrease.
Further work on what motivates program participation is warranted to fully understand
what the Maryland DNR could do to increase participation.
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APPENDIX

The purpose of this appendix is to present a detailed description of the GIS analysis
discussed in Chapter 3, which describes the forestry cost-share programs available for
landowners in Maryland. The GIS analysis was conducted to determine the eligible
number of acres for WIP and for L2W. As a reminder, anyone who owns between five
and 1,000 acres of woodland and agrees to uphold improved forestry management
practices for 15 years is eligible for WIP. Further, any private landowner with at least one
acre of lawn qualifies for L2W. The eligibility criteria were based on these program
requirements. Table 1 shows the GIS data sources used in the analysis.
GIS data layers are reported in either raster or vector format. Both were used for
this analysis. Raster data is organized in a matrix of cells, in which each cell has a unique
value. Vector data is organized in one of the following formats: polygons, lines, or points.
The first step in the GIS analysis was to convert the polygon layers to raster layers. The
reason for the conversion was because the eligibility requirements for the cost-share
programs were first applied to each cell individually, so all of the data needed to be in
raster format. Once the eligible cells were selected, appropriately sized portions of
eligible cells were isolated by converting the eligible patches of cells back into polygons
and using the polygon areas.
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Appendix Table 1. GIS Data Sources and Layers Used in Analysis
Data Source
Maryland Carbon
Monitoring System
(Dubayah et al., 2013)
National Land Cover
Database (Jin et al., 2013)

Maryland Protected Lands
Map Server (Maryland
iMAP 2014)

Layers Used

Layer Format

Maryland Statewide Canopy
Cover

30-meter raster

Maryland Statewide Carbon
Sequestration Potential

90-meter raster

Maryland Statewide Land
Cover Classifications

30-meter raster

Maryland DNR Owned
Properties and Conservation
Easements

polygon

Rural Legacy Properties

polygon

Maryland Environmental Trust
Easements
Forest Conservation Act
Easements
Maryland Agricultural Land
Preservation Foundation
Easements

polygon
polygon
polygon

Local Protected Lands

polygon

Private Conservation Lands

polygon

Protected Federal Lands

polygon

Once the polygon layers from the Maryland Protected Lands Map Server were
converted to raster, they were combined into one layer. The reason for the combination of
layers was to decrease the number of steps to select eligible cells for each program. In the
combined layer, any cell with a value of ‘0’ was a piece of land that was not part of any
of the original polygon layers. In other words, any cell with a value of ‘0’ was not owned
by DNR or in some sort of conservation easement. The combined layer was named
‘Conservation Layers,’ which is how it is labeled in the rest of the analysis.

105
Model Builder in ArcMap was used to do the rest of the analysis. The WIP and
L2W models are very similar. The first goal of the analysis was to calculate a raster layer
that reported a ‘1’ for all cells of eligible land, according to the criteria for the two
programs.
For the WIP model, the criteria were: Conservation Layers = 0 and Canopy Cover
>= 95%. These criteria select all cells that are privately owned and contain a canopy
cover of at least 95%.
For the L2W model, the criteria were: Conservation Layers = 0, Canopy Cover <=
30%, and NLCD = 21 (Developed, Open Space). Most large lawn spaces in the Maryland
imagery were classified as ‘developed, open space,’ so that is how this criteria was
chosen. These criteria select cells that are privately owned, covered by no more than 30%
canopy cover, and classified as ‘developed, open space.’ Originally, an eligibility
requirement of 0% canopy cover was chosen, but in reality, most lawn space has a few
trees on it. For this reason, 30% canopy cover was used to represent lawn that may have
some trees on it but would definitely be able to accommodate more trees from
participation in the L2W program.
The second goal of the analysis was to select only the patches of eligible land that
met the acreage requirements (5 acres for WIP and 1 acre for L2W). The first step was to
isolate patches of eligible land since there were so many long strings of cells that passed
the eligibility criteria but were not actually eligible for the programs. For example, long
strings of road side trees passed the eligibility criteria for WIP, but they are not actually
forest patches. This task was accomplished by using the ‘Focal Statistics’ tool. This tool
calculates a statistic of the values within a specified neighborhood around each cell. By
using a 3x3 rectangle as the specified neighborhood around each cell, any cell with a
value of ‘9’ was eligible land that was surrounded on all sides by eligible land.
For the WIP model, a value of ‘9’ was used as the required criteria, and for L2W,
any value >= ‘4’ was required. The reason why the L2W value is lower is because the
acreage requirement is smaller, so it is not as important that a cell is surrounded on all
sides by other eligible land.
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The next step was to convert the eligible patches of land into polygons. As
mentioned earlier, this conversion was made because the patches of eligible cells needed
to be selected based on their acreage. The easiest way to calculate areas using GIS data is
to have the data in a polygon format. For the WIP model, all polygons with an area >=
20,234.3 m2 (5 acres) were selected, and for the L2W model, all polygons with an area
>= 4,046.9 m2 (1 acre) were selected. By adding the areas of all of the eligible polygons,
the total number of eligible acres for each program was calculated.
The third goal of the analysis was to calculate the carbon sequestration potential for
the selected eligible polygons. This task was accomplished by using the ‘Zonal Statistics’
tool. This tool calculates statistics based on values of a raster, within the zones of another
dataset. In this case, the raster layer used was the Carbon Sequestration Potential layer,
and the zones were the selected eligible polygons for each program. In other words, the
carbon sequestration potential values for each cell within each eligible polygon were
added together in this step, resulting in a total carbon sequestration potential value for
each polygon. By adding the carbon sequestration potential values for all of the eligible
polygons, the total carbon sequestration potential was calculated for each program.
Example results are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The resulting polygons are
overlaid with Maryland imagery to illustrate that the analysis does in fact select polygons
that look eligible according to the imagery. In Figure 1, the polygon is part of a large
forested area (eligible for WIP), and in Figure 2 the polygons are in an urban fringe area
where the houses are spread out enough to have large lawn space (eligible for L2W). A
limitation of the L2W results is that certain areas of land meet all of the analysis
requirements, but they are not actually lawn when they are compared with the imagery.
For example, golf courses and baseball fields are included in the results.
The total acreage eligible for each program is 736,761.5 acres for WIP and 230,450
acres for L2W. The total carbon sequestration potential (excluding current aboveground
biomass) for each program is 138,816,892 metric tons for WIP and 301,563,830 metric
tons for L2W. These results indicate that the carbon sequestration potential of the land
that could be enrolled in either WIP or L2W is quite substantial. It is important to
remember that the carbon sequestration potential values are the sum of all carbon
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sequestered over the lifetime of the trees. In other words, these are not annual values.
However, over 400 million metric tons could be sequestered on the eligible land, which is
about four years’ worth of total emissions for Maryland.

Appendix Figure 1. Example WIP Analysis Results
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Appendix Figure 2. Example L2W Analysis Results

